Something for the Mullahs to Think About

Against the background of the continuing Iranian-Israeli tensions, it may be useful to take another look at what is at stake. Iran is a large country comprising some 1,600,000 square kilometers, Israel a very small one with just about 28,000, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip included. In terms of population the difference is as 88,000,000 to 9,500,000. Short of dropping some nuclear bombs on a few key Iranian cities, how can David expect to fight Goliath and win?

For one possible answer, consider the following. Iran is a country of many mountains, quite a number of rivers—none very long, incidentally—and dams. Out of a total of 183 currently operational dams, 52 are related to the Caspian Sea catchment area. 12 are based in the Urmia basin further to the southwest, 68 are located in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman watersheds, 34 are in the Central Plateau, 11 are in Sarakhs catchment basin, and other dams are located across the eastern boundary basin (Hamoun). Most are serving one or more of the following four purposes. 1. Flood control. 2. Providing drinking water. 3. Agricultural irrigation. 4. Electricity-generation.

The biggest dam is the Karkheh Dam (capacity 5,900,000,000 cubic meters). Next come the Bakhtiari Dam (4,845,000,000 cubic meters), the Dez Dam (3,340,000,000), the Seimarem Dam (3,200,000,000), the Chamshir Dam (2,300,000,000), the Karun 4 Dam (2,000,000,000), the Marun Dam (1,200,000,000), the Lar Dam (960,000,000), the Sardasht Dam (545,000,000), the, the Daryan Dam (316,000,000), the Ashavan Dam (260,000,000), the Mamloo Dam (250,000,000), and the Al Kabir Dam (202,000,000). The maximum capacity of all dams combined is believed to be around 55,000,000,000 cubic meters.

Simply gathering the vast amounts of data needed to asses what a coordinated attack on these and other dams could do to the country would require entire regiments of experts. The more so because many of the details are unavailable to the public. It is, however, worth-while to bring up the following story. In May 1941 the officers at the Africa Corps headquarters were a worried lot. This is surprising, given that the corps, brilliantly led by General Erwin Rommel, had just completed a spectacular 1,100-kilometer advance that took it from the gates of Tripoli all the way to Sallum, a small village just east of the border between Italian Libya and British-ruled Egypt. Measured in terms of driving distance the figure was even larger. Should the German advance continue it would soon reach the Nile. And that was just what the Germans were worried about. Suppose the British, ere they abandoned Egypt and retreated into the Sinai and from there into Palestine, blew up the Aswan Dam; what would happen then?

A coded message—chefsache, nur durch Offizaier—went out to the General Staff. From there it was passed on to the experts of the newly founded Wehrtechnische Fakultaet, the newly-founded Military-Technological Faculty of the University of Berlin. It took a few days before a reply was received. When it did, it pointed out that the capacity of the Dam—meaning, the old British-built one that had been completed in 1902 and was by far the largest in the world until that time—was 5,300,000,000 cubic meters (5.3 cubic kilometers) of water. Just what so much water could do to the vulnerable land to the north depended on many variables. However, provided the demolition job was carried out in the right way (starting from the middle and working its way in both directions, rather than the other way around) and during the right season of the year (starting in July and lasting until November) it would occasion a monstrous wave, thirty to forty meters high, drowning everything in its path to the Mediterranean. Including, some 690 kilometers away, the capital of Cairo which at that time was a city of a million and a half out of a total of about 18,000,000.

In terms of capacity, several of the Iranian reservoirs are comparable with the one created by the Old Aswan Dam. Surely there must be something for the Mullahs to think about here?

Guest Article: Why Hamas Will Lose

By

Colonel (res.) Dr. Moshe Ben David*

Professor Yuval Harari, who teaches modern history at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, has turned himself into one of the leading intellectuals of the Western world. His books, particularly Homo Deus, deal with important turning points in human history as well as our ability to survive into the future. In no small part thanks in part to President Obama’s endorsement, they reached the stop of the best-sellers list. As requests for articles and interviews came pouring in, they also made the author famous. True, many of his best known prophecies have neither materialized nor look as if they are going to be materialized. Instead of making progress towards a better, more peaceful and better off, world what we see is Covid-17, starvation in the Sudan, and war both in Europe and the Middle East; not to mention terrorism over much of the world. None of this has caused Harari to lose confidence in himself and his ability to look into the future. In particular, in an article just published on Israel’s most important news website as well as a CNN-interview with Christiane Amanpour, he discussed the future of Israel’s war against Hamas. Israel, so Harari, has no chance of winning the war. Why? Because, to do so, the government in Jerusalem would have to lay down clear objectives, something which, so far, it has been unable to do. Israel, he went on to say, needs a new government. One that would drop its “preposterous Biblical fantasies” concerning a complete victory and prepare for some kind of compromise. He ends by saying that Israel and Hamas have reached an impasse. Even in case the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) succeed in defeating Hamas and disarming it, the real outcome will be a defeat for Israel. The only way to prevent such a situation is compromise, negotiation and peace.

I’d like to use, as my opening shot, the work of the widely respected American political scientist Bernard Brodie (1910-78). To be viable, so Brodie, a military-political plan must take into account objectives and means; including, among the latter, the balance of armed force and society’s willingness to sacrifice some of its young men in the process of attaining them. Seen in this light, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statement, on the first day of the war, that Israel’s objective is “the complete destruction of Hamas”—the organization which, on 7 October 2023, subjected Israel to a surprise attack and inflicted some 1,000 casualties in a single day—appears both reasonable and attainable. Reasonable, because it reminds one of the Allies’ highly successful “unconditional surrender” during World War II, a formula that proved highly successful. Attainable, because of the military balance in Gaza. Clearly, in case Israel fails to achieve Netanyahu’s stated objective it will have to change its policy. That is what the cabinet is for.

Here it is worth adding that there exists a fundamental difference between the attacker and the attacked. The former, in this case Hamas, can adopt any objectives he wants. The latter, in this case Israel, faces a simple choice: either fight or surrender. Supposing he decides to fight, his only objective can be to defeat the enemy. Everything else comes later and must necessarily depend on events on the battlefield—meaning that the relationship between objectives and means must remain flexible and cannot be nearly as rigid as Harari imagines. Indeed the whole idea of laying down the political objectives ahead of events on the battlefield, which is what he seems to say, is, to use a term I have used before in this article, preposterous.

Second, his claim that, to win the war or at any rate not to lose it, Israel must have a new government. One that will rid itself of all kind of all kinds of illusions concerning total victory and prepared for some kind of compromise. In this context it seems that Harari is unaware of the fact that, right from the beginning of the war, the IDF has been following the government’s guidance step by step. Not a single encounter with the IDF that did not end with Hamas being defeated, either by having its troops killed, wounded or captured or when those troops evacuated their positions, leaving its enemy in control or the battlefield. One does not change a winning horse in the midst of a race; doing so can only strengthen Hamas in its decision to fight on. Besides, what does Harari think a change of government could achieve? Suppose the Israel decides to change its objective as laid down by Netanyahu and aim at replacing Hamas’s rule in Gaza by one run by the (Palestinian Authority) in Ramallah; does anyone really believe that Hamas will tamely sit down and agree? Halil Shkaki, the Palestinian’s Authority’s number one expert on polls and polling, says that 73 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank support Hamas and are in favor of the atrocities it has committed. Furthermore, the Authority spends 1.3 billion shekel, or 7 percent of its annual budget, assisting the relatives of Palestinian casualties who died while fighting Israel. This on top of symbolic gestures such as naming streets and squares after them, praising them in the schoolbooks it makes children study, and the like. Ending the war with a compromise, such as Harari suggests, will only enable Hamas to take over the West Bank in addition to Gaza, putting Israel’s heartland within easy reach of some of the heavy weapons it already has.

Harari’s third claim, namely that Israel and Hamas have reached an impasses that can only end in an Israeli defeat, is also wrong. Soon after the successful massacre they committed on 7 October Hamas’ leaders announced they were expecting to follow up with additional measures of the same kind. Unfortunately for them but fortunately for Israel, so far it does not appear as if they are able to realize that threat. Here is another, and much more likely scenario: following its successes so far, and after a due period of rest and reconstruction, the IDF will enter the city of Raffia in the southern part of the Strip and do away with the residuals of Hamas’ organized units on land, in the air, at sea, and underground. The oft-heard comparisons with the IDF in Lebanon as well as the American adventures in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq are, in reality, irrelevant. Why? Because the Gaza Strip only comprises 1.42 square miles, equal to 0.00083 percent of Iraqi territory, 0.00055 percent of Afghan territory, 0.0011 percent of Vietnamese territory, and 0.034 percent of Lebanese territory. Once Raffia is dealt with, all Israel will need to defeat what remains of Hamas and completely dominate the country is three brigades.

Dominating the Strip on all sides will also isolate it from the external world and make it much harder to smuggle in the kind of arms, money, and logistic support terrorists and guerrillas require. In this context it is important to keep in mind the fact that Gaza’s population is not homogeneous. About one third, consisting of natives (as opposed to those who left Israel at one point or another), supports the PA and would like few things better than settling accounts with Hamas which has been maltreating them ever since the Israelis withdrew almost two decades ago.

To sum up, it stands to reason that, even after it completes its occupation of the Strip, the IDF will have to carry out sporadic anti-terrorist operations. In doing so it will be able to draw on half a century’s experience not only in the Strip but in the West Bank as well. Ending terrorism will not be easy and will take time. However, given the various types of specialist forces the IDF deploys as well the various innovative techniques it has devised, many of which are the envy of foreign farmed forces and are widely imitated, there is no reason why the struggle will not lead to a successful end. Finally a word about the “preposterous Biblical fantasies” that, says Harari, are dreamt up by all kinds of Israeli extremists, including not a few in the government itself.  Nietzsche in his Untimely Meditations says that those who condemn the past endanger both themselves and others. This is because we are all products of the past, complete with all its problems, passions, errors and even crimes. That again is why, for both individual and nations, to deny their past is tantamount to shooting oneself. This is true of Harari himself; but it is even more true of countless others the world over who think as he does.

Col. (res) Dr. Moshe Ben David, is a retired IDF infantry officer with much experience in counterinsurgency. He is also a former vice president of Amadox Inc.

Konseptsia

As you may have guessed, konseptsia (plural, konseptsiot) is a Hebrew word we Israelis often use. It means, roughly, a system of interlocking ideas (sometimes known, in English, as “parameters”) that, taken together, form a framework for thought. Rather than try to provide a closer definition, I will provide you with three examples of past konseptsiot that have paid a critically important role in the Israel’s history and are helping shape world history right down to the present day.

Konseptsia No. 1. To say that Israel has long history of fighting many of its Arab neighbors would be an understatement. The Arab Revolt of 1936-39, the 1948 War of Independence, the 1956 Suez Campaign, and countless smaller incidents followed each other in an almost unbroken chain. Still, as of the winter of 1966-67 there seemed to be no sign of an immediate threat. At the General Staff, the Intelligence Division was inclined to attribute this to the fact that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser had sent some of his best troops to Yemen to assist rebels against the government there. As a result, it was thought, he was in no position to wage war against Israel until further notice.

So far so good. But then, all of a sudden, things began to happen. Rather than allowing events in Yemen to give up any plans for a war with Israel, Nasser, perhaps because he worried lest Israel would soon be in possession of its first nuclear warheads, decided to use the prevailing tension between Israel and Syria to withdraw his troops from Yemen. Next, on 14 May 1967, he sent 110,000 of them into the Sinai Peninsula. Not content with this, on 18 May Nasser demanded that the UN withdraw its troops which had been stationed there since 1956-7 and were meant to separate the two sides. Granted his wish, on 22 May he closed the Red Sea to Israeli shipping, thereby undoing the fruit of the 1956 Suez Campaign and effectively cutting Israel’s maritime communications with the Far East. On 30 May King Hussein of Jordan arrived in Cairo where he signed a mutual defense pact with Egypt; a few days later Iraq too joined the alliance. As Israel watched the konseptsia, which said that another war any time soon was highly unlikely, collapsed, triggering a crisis in the government and near panic among the population. In the end it was only by means of a full-scale Israeli offensive against its neighbors that the situation was saved.

Konseptsia No. 2. Following its spectacular victory of June 1967, Israel was left in possession of the Sinai Peninsula (taken from Egypt), the Golan Heights (taken from Syria) and the West Bank (taken from Jordan). Six years later, in spite of the so-called War of Attrition waged by Israel and Egypt along the Suez Canal in in 1968-70, this situation still prevailed. Central to the confidence Israel exuded during those years was the belief, firmly held by the General Staff, that neither Egypt nor Syria would dare go to war without making sure they had air superiority first. Since this kind of superiority was deemed to be beyond those countries’ reach, Israeli Intelligence considered war to be highly unlikely.

However, reality refused to agree with theory. Instead of building up their air forces to the point where they could match the Israeli one the Egyptian and Syrians armies, lavishly supported by the Soviet Union, focused on vast arrays of anti-aircraft defenses to provide them with the cover they needed. On 6 October 1973, with some 350,000 first line troops between them, they attacked. They crossed the Suez Canal and, in the north, came very close to overrunning the Golan Heights. It took the Israelis eighteen days of ferocious fighting, as well as some 3,000 casualties (KIA only), to redress the situation. Once again, the konseptsia had failed.

Konseptsia No. 3. Though they fought outnumbered two or three to one, the October 1973 War did bring out the best in Israel’s fighting forces. Still the outcome of the war in question was much less decisive than that of its 1967 predecessor. Which explains why, starting late in that year and spilling over into 1974-75, an inquiry was held to discover the origins of the intelligence failure that had caused Israel to be taken by surprise and made possible the Arab’s early victories. The investigation appears to have been thorough, leading to the dismissal of the chief of staff and the chief of intelligence. A third high ranking casualty was the commander, Southern Front. Perhaps more important in the long run, both the intelligence-gathering process and the organization responsible for obtaining and disseminating it were reformed, albeit in ways that are not always available to the public.

Fifty years passed. By late 2023 Israel had been battling terrorism, especially but not exclusively that launched from Gaza, for ages. Assuredly it was a nuisance; but one to which the Israel Defense Forces had become accustomed and with which it had learnt to live, more or less. The border was fortified—with the aid, among other things, of a one-of-its-type heavy steel, sensor-studded, partition that surrounded the Strip and prevented the construction of underground tunnels—and equipped with lookout posts positioned so as to support each other and leave no square inch of land uncovered. Fences, searchlights, killing zones, and any number of other devices combined to make crossing the border without being detected almost impossible. For months prior to 7 October intelligence, some of it electronic, some obtained with the aid of drones, and some originating in the (mostly female, incidentally) lookouts in their lightly fortified positions, showed signs that something was afoot. Including, in particular, exercises mounted by Hamas by way of rehearsing an attack. Repeatedly, warnings went up the chain of command. As repeatedly, they were pushed aside. With Hamas’s past performance in mind, neither the Intelligence Division nor Southern Command could bring themselves to think that Hamas was capable of much more than mounting a company-size raid.

*

Came 7 October, a Jewish holiday. In a replay of 1973, several key commanders were with their families, enjoying a well-deserved break from duty. Presumably that was one reason why the Israelis were slow to react, requiring hours and hours before its armored forces and air force took up the fight. What happened next has been told many times and will surely continue to be told many times in the future. Instead of coming up with a company sized attack or two, Hamas sent in the equivalent of a brigade. In its wake came a mob of less disciplined marauders who, it turns out, were responsible for many if not most the atrocities committed by Hamas on that day. Instead of operating by stealth while trying to infiltrate the defenses, they brought bulldozers to tear them down. Instead of trying to avoid the lookouts, they attacked them head-on in their bunker-like, but still all too light, fortifications. Having crossed the frontier they spread out westward. Blocking Israeli roads, shooting up Israeli traffic, overrunning some nearby Israeli settlements, disrupting a music festival held nearby, and inflicting over a thousand casualties in dead alone—the largest number, as has been pointed out, of Jews killed in a single day since the end of the Holocaust. As these lines were being written over two months later Israel, its society and its armed forces were still fighting to deal with the consequences of the attack.

Don’t get me wrong. I am not saying that those who did not see the writing on the wall were idiots. Or that they neglected their duty, “falling asleep while on guard,” as the Hebrew phrase goes. Or that the technology deployed along the frontier was not good enough. Far from that being the case, it was some of the best and most advanced ever seen. What I am saying is something far more profound and much more important: namely that, much as people blame the konseptsia as the factor that guided and misguided Israel’s political-military thought, without some kind of konseptsia thought itself is impossible. Sticking with it may mean disaster; dismantling it risks leaving behind a jumble of incoherent, often vague and conflicting and misleading, ideas. When Clausewitz famously wrote about war, waged by fallible human beings under the most intense kind of pressure, being the province of confusion and misunderstanding he knew what he was talking about.

And so, dear readers, regardless of what technological progress, specifically including AI, may still some up with, it will remain. And not just in the military sphere either.

You Are Right, He Said

As a fairly well known Israeli historian, I’ve visited some thirty-five different countries around the world and spent a not inconsiderable part of my life abroad. It may have been luck, it may have been naiveté; it may have been the fact that my last visit (to Germany) took place as long as three months ago. But never in all those years did I encounter antisemitism. At any rate not of the overt kind that is deliberately and unapologetically thrown into your face. Wherever we went my wife and I made gentile friends. Good friends.

More than once in Western Europe in particular we got into a conversation with people of Arabic nationality. Without exception, they asked my wife and me where we were from. Without exception, they were polite and welcoming. One, a kiosk owner in Metz, eastern France, told us how wonderful it was to meet Israelis in his nice, but remote and oh-so boring, town. Another, a young man from East Jerusalem who was studying medical technology in Berlin and working for Ikea to earn some money, went out of his way to get us a free meal ticket at the shop restaurant. The least pleasant encounter was one I had with a Palestinian taxi driver in Copenhagen. He gave me to understand, repeatedly, that he and his people would never-ever give up “their” right to “their” country. Yet even so we found common ground in denouncing those holier-than-thou Danes.

Still I want to tell you a story. Just one trivial story with no consequences and presumably long forgotten by everyone except myself. Yet one that, in view of recent events here in Israel, seems more relevant than ever. It took place back in the summer of 1981 when I was on sabbatical and living near Freiburg in southwestern Germany. One day my daughter, nine years old, needed her ear to be operated on. I fell into a conversation with the surgeon, Dr. Kuhn of the local university clinic.

These were the days immediately following the attack in which the Israeli Air Force demolished Iraq’s nuclear reactor, then under construction. The good doctor asked me why I was staying in Israel. So much trouble, he said; so many wars. Strange question, that, coming from a German! But that was not what I said. Instead I told him the story of the Jewish swine. Suppose, I said, I had the same operation done in Israel and then refused to pay my bill. In that case people would have called me a swine. However, had I done the same anywhere else, they would have called me a Jewish swine.

“You are right” he said.

Pilar Rahola Speaks: Jews with Six Arms

by Pilar Rahola

Why do so many intelligent people, when talking about Israel, suddenly become idiots?

This speech was given December 16, 2009 at the Conference in the Global forum for Combating Anti-Semitism in Jerusalem. Pilar Rahola is a Spanish Catalan journalist, writer, and former politician and Member of Parliament, and member of the far left.

A meeting in Barcelona with a hundred lawyers and judges a month ago.

They have come together to hear my opinions on the Middle-Eastern conflict. They know that I am a heterodoxal vessel, in the shipwreck of “single thinking” regarding Israel, which rules in my country. They want to listen to me, because they ask themselves why, if Pilar is a serious journalist, does she risk losing her credibility by defending the bad guys, the guilty? I answer provocatively – You all believe that you are experts in international politics when you talk about Israel, but you really know nothing. Would you dare talk about the conflict in Rwanda, in Kashmir? In Chechnya? – No.

Cultured people, when they read about Israel, are ready to believe that Jews have six arms.

They are jurists, their turf is not geopolitics. But against Israel they dare, as does everybody else. Why? Because Israel is permanently under the media magnifying glass and the distorted image pollutes the world’s brains. And because it is part of what is politically correct, it seems part of solidarity, because talking against Israel is free. So cultured people, when they read about Israel, are ready to believe that Jews have six arms, in the same way that during the Middle Ages people believed all sorts of outrageous things.

Bottom of Form

The first question, then, is why so many intelligent people, when talking about Israel, suddenly become idiots. The problem that those of us who do not demonize Israel have, is that there exists no debate on the conflict. All that exists is the banner; there’s no exchange of ideas. We throw slogans at each other; we don’t have serious information, we suffer from the “burger journalism” syndrome, full of prejudices, propaganda and simplification. Intellectual thinkers and international journalists have given up on Israel. It doesn’t exist. That is why, when someone tries to go beyond the “single thought” of criticizing Israel, he becomes suspect and unfaithful, and is immediately segregated. Why?

I’ve been trying to answer this question for years: why?

Why, of all the conflicts in the world, only this one interests them?

Why is a tiny country which struggles to survive criminalized?

Why does manipulated information triumph so easily?

Why are all the people of Israel, reduced to a simple mass of murderous imperialists?

Why is there no Palestinian guilt?

Why is Arafat a hero and Sharon a monster?

Finally, why when Israel is the only country in the World which is threatened with extinction, it is also the only one that nobody considers a victim?

I don’t believe that there is a single answer to these questions. Just as it is impossible to completely explain the historical evil of anti-Semitism, it is also not possible to totally explain the present-day imbecility of anti-Israelism. Both drink from the fountain of intolerance and lies. Also, if we accept that anti-Israelism is the new form of anti-Semitism, we conclude that circumstances may have changed, but the deepest myths, both of the Medieval Christian anti-Semitism and of the modern political anti-Semitism, are still intact. Those myths are part of the chronicle of Israel.

For example, the Medieval Jew accused of killing Christian children to drink their blood connects directly with the Israeli Jew who kills Palestinian children to steal their land. Always they are innocent children and dark Jews. Similarly, the Jewish bankers who wanted to dominate the world through the European banks, according to the myth of the Protocols, connect directly with the idea that the Wall Street Jews want to dominate the World through the White House. Control of the Press, control of Finances, the Universal Conspiracy, all that which has created the historical hatred against the Jews, is found today in hatred of the Israelis. In the subconscious, then, beats the DNA of the Western anti-Semite, which produces an efficient cultural medium.

But what beats in the conscious? Why does a renewed intolerance surge with such virulence, centered now, not against the Jewish people, but against the Jewish state? From my point of view, this has historical and geopolitical motives, among others, the decades long bloody Soviet role, the European Anti-Americanism, the West’s energy dependency and the growing Islamist phenomenon.

But it also emerges from a set of defeats which we suffer as free societies, leading to a strong ethical relativism.

The moral defeat of the left. For decades, the left raised the flag of freedom wherever there was injustice. It was the depositary of the utopian hopes of society. It was the great builder of the future. Despite the murderous evil of Stalinism’s sinking these utopias, the left has preserved intact its aura of struggle, and still pretends to point out good and evil in the world. Even those who would never vote for leftist options, grant great prestige to leftist intellectuals, and allow them to be the ones who monopolize the concept of solidarity. As they have always done. Thus, those who struggled against Pinochet were freedom-fighters, but Castro’s victims, are expelled from the heroes’ paradise, and converted into undercover fascists.

This historic treason to freedom is reproduced nowadays, with mathematical precision. For example, the leaders of Hezbollah are considered resistance heroes, while pacifists like the Israeli singer Noa, are insulted in the streets of Barcelona. Today too, as yesterday, the left is hawking totalitarian ideologies, falls in love with dictators and, in its offensive against Israel, ignores the destruction of fundamental rights. It hates rabbis, but falls in love with imams; shouts against the Israeli Defense Forces, but applauds Hamas’s terrorists; weeps for the Palestinian victims, but scorns the Jewish victims, and when it is touched by Palestinian children, it does it only if it can blame the Israelis.

It will never denounce the culture of hatred, or its preparation for murder. A year ago, at the AIPAC conference in Washington I asked the following questions:

Why don’t we see demonstrations in Europe against the Islamic dictatorships?

Why are there no demonstrations against the enslavement of millions of Muslim women?

Why are there no declarations against the use of bomb-carrying children in the conflicts in which Islam is involved?

Why is the left only obsessed with fighting against two of the most solid democracies of the planet, those which have suffered the bloodiest terrorist attacks, the United States and Israel?

Because the left no longer has any ideas, only slogans. It no longer defends rights, but prejudices. And the greatest prejudice of all is the one aimed against Israel. I accuse, then, in a formal manner that the main responsibility for the new anti-Semitic hatred disguised as anti-Zionism, comes from those who should have been there to defend freedom, solidarity and progress. Far from it, they defend despots, forget their victims and remain silent before medieval ideologies which aim at the destruction of free societies. The treason of the left is an authentic treason against modernity.

Israel is the world’s most watched place, but despite that, it is the world’s least understood place.

Defeat of Journalism. We have more information in the world than ever before, but we do not have a better informed world. Quite the contrary, the information superhighway connects us anywhere in the planet, but it does not connect us with the truth. Today’s journalists do not need maps, since they have Google Earth, they do not need to know History, since they have Wikipedia. The historical journalists, who knew the roots of a conflict, still exist, but they are an endangered species, devoured by that “fast food” journalism which offers hamburger news, to readers who want fast-food information. Israel is the world’s most watched place, but despite that, it is the world’s least understood place. Of course one must keep in mind the pressure of the great petrodollar lobbies, whose influence upon journalism is subtle but deep. Mass media knows that if it speaks against Israel, it will have no problems. But what would happen if it criticized an Islamic country? Without doubt, it would complicate its existence. Certainly part of the press that writes against Israel, would see themselves mirrored in Mark Twain’s ironical sentence: “Get your facts first, then you can distort them as you please.”

Defeat of critical thinking. To all this one must add the ethical relativism which defines the present times: it is based not on denying the values of civilization, but rather in their most extreme banality. What is modernity?

I explain it with this little tale: If I were lost in an uncharted island, and would want to found a democratic society, I would only need three written documents: The Ten Commandments (which established the first code of modernity. “Thou shalt not murder” founded modern civilization.); The Roman Penal Code; and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. And with these three texts we would start again. These principles are relativized daily, even by those who claim to be defending them.

“Thou shalt not murder” … depending on who is the target, must think those who, like the demonstrators in Europe, shouted in support of Hamas.

“Hurray for Freedom of Speech!”…, or not. For example, several Spanish left-wing organizations tried to take me to court, accusing me of being a negationist, like the Nazis, because I deny the “Palestinian Holocaust”. They were attempting to prohibit me from writing articles and to send me to prison. And so on… The social critical mass has lost weight and, at the same time ideological dogmatism has gained weight. In this double turn of events, the strong values of modernity have been substituted by a “weak thinking,” vulnerable to manipulation and Manichaeism.

Defeat of the United Nations. And with it, a sound defeat of the international organizations which should protect Human Rights. Instead they have become broken puppets in the hands of despots. The United Nations is only useful to Islamofascists like Ahmadinejad, or dangerous demagogues like Hugo Chavez which offers them a planetary loudspeaker where they can spit their hatred. And, of course, to systematically attack Israel. The UN, too exists to fight Israel.

Finally, defeat of Islam. Tolerant and cultural Islam suffers today the violent attack of a totalitarian virus which tries to stop its ethical development. This virus uses the name of God to perpetrate the most terrible horrors: lapidate women, enslave them, use youths as human bombs. Let’s not forget: They kill us with cellular phones connected to the Middle Ages. If Stalinism destroyed the left, and Nazism destroyed Europe, Islamic fundamentalism is destroying Islam. And it also has an anti-Semitic DNA. Perhaps Islamic anti-Semitism is the most serious intolerant phenomenon of our times; indeed, it contaminates more than 1,400 million people, who are educated, massively, in hatred towards the Jew.

The Jews are the thermometer of the world’s health. Whenever the world has had totalitarian fever, they have suffered.

In the crossroads of these defeats, is Israel. Orphan and forgotten by a reasonable left, orphan and abandoned by serious journalism, orphan and rejected by a decent UN, and rejected by a tolerant Islam, Israel suffers the paradigm of the 21st Century: the lack of a solid commitment with the values of liberty. Nothing seems strange. Jewish culture represents, as no other does, the metaphor of a concept of civilization which suffers today attacks on all flanks. The Jews are the thermometer of the world’s health. Whenever the world has had totalitarian fever, they have suffered. In the Spanish Middle Ages, in Christian persecutions, in Russian pogroms, in European Fascism, in Islamic fundamentalism. Always, the first enemy of totalitarianism has been the Jew. And, in these times of energy dependency and social uncertainty, Israel embodies, in its own flesh, the eternal Jew.

A pariah nation among nations, for a pariah people among peoples. That is why the anti-Semitism of the 21st Century has dressed itself with the efficient disguise of anti-Israelism, or its synonym, anti-Zionism. Is all criticism of Israel anti-Semitism? NO. But all present-day anti-Semitism has turned into prejudice and the demonization of the Jewish State. New clothes for an old hatred.

Benjamin Franklin said: “Where liberty is, there is my country.” And Albert Einstein added: “The World is a dangerous place. Not because of the people who are evil; but because of the people who don’t do anything about it.” This is the double commitment, here and now; never remain inactive in front of evil in action and defend the countries of liberty.

Thank you.

This is WAR!

As anyone who has gone through it knows, war is the domain of confusion. Some people don’t see the enemy when and where he is there (this is what happened to us in Israel). Others “see” him when and where he is not. Everyone’s nerves are on edge, causing them to behave somewhat strangely and often making measured, coherent communication all but impossible. Rumors, censorship, disinformation and plain deception abound. Obstructed by censorship, clearing up the confusion so as to get a proper picture of what is happening can take weeks, months, years, or even decades. Indeed the more evidence emerges, the greater often the difficulty of shifting through it all and making sense of it all. 

Yet man is the explaining animal. His huge forebrain means that he cannot exist without some kind of scaffolding to explain what has happened, why it happened, and what is likely to happen next. Absent a real explanation, he will first invent an unreal one and then, by repeating it, convince himself that it is true. Still, at the risk that everything I say will quickly be disproved, I shall try to pose some questions I have been asked and my answers to them.

Hamas took Israeli military intelligence, supposedly the world’s best, totally by surprise. How could this have happened?

It is as Nietzsche says: A great victory makes the winner stupid and the loser, malicious.

Can you explain?

Yes. It seems to have been a question of mirror-imaging. The confrontation with Hamas has now lasted for about twenty years. The IDF being greatly superior to Hamas, every clash ended in some sort of victory for Israel (or so at least the government and general staff, mindful of public relations, said). As “victories” piled up on top of each other, Israel’s confidence that it could handle this kind of attack grew. Just days before the sky came down on 7 October military intelligence was telling “the political echelon” (as we say here) that Hamas was being “deterred” and wanted nothing other than quiet. Punctuated, perhaps, by a few pinpricks to show it still existed and had something to say.

Today is Wednesday, the 17th of October and the twelfth day of the war. What is the situation now?

As far as I can see, the worst for Israel is over. The country has been put on a war footing, complete with the evacuation of many settlements bordering on the Gaza Strip. The reserves, 300,000 of them, have been called up and are deploying for action. Above all, the element of surprise is gone.

Obviously the first task is to make sure that no more terrorists remain at large inside Israel, a slow and, in terms of the necessary manpower needed to search every stone, expensive process. In the meantime, no doubt Israel’s airpower will continue bombing the hell out of Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip. In fact I can hear the jets flying in the skies above.

How did the destruction of al-Ahli hospital in Gaza affect the course of the war?

We—meaning, man (and woman)—have a strong tendency to always pounce on the latest events as the most important ones of all. After the attack on the hospital took place Hamas was quick to blame Israel, making the latter’s enemies leap for joy and causing Israelis to fear for the international support their country so urgently needs. Once it turned out that it was a rocket fired by the Islamic Jihad which did the damage and killed people things returned more or less to “normal.” Meaning, both sides stick to their strategy. Hamas in sending rockets into Israel in the hope of killing and injuring as many people as possible. And the Israeli military, in trying to “get” as many terrorists as possible so as make them stop doing so.

President Biden visited Israel and stayed for about five hours. What has he achieved?

The original objective of the visit was to a. Demonstrate American support for Israel; b. Help enlist humanitarian assistance the residents of Gaza; c. Bring together Palestinian, Jordanian, and Egyptian leaders in the hope of finding some kind of solution to the crisis. The first and second of these objective may have been achieved, at least to some extent. As to the third, no progress at all.   

Will there be a full-scale Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip?

I hope not. The Strip is one of the most heavily populated and urbanized pieces of land in the world. If that were not enough, the population is among the youngest—fully half of it is under nineteen years old. In countless cases, a combination of unemployment and chronic shortages mean that these people have nothing to lose, increasing their hatred for Israel and turning them into easy targets for Hamas recruiters.

As the World War II sieges of Leningrad and Stalingrad e.g showed, urban terrain, provided it is properly defended, can present an attacker with formidable problems. The deeper into it he wades, the greater his problems. Such as getting in supplies and reinforcements, ambushes, evacuating the wounded, etc.

How about Hezbollah in Lebanon? Will it join the fray, or will it stay out?

Very difficult to say. Hezbollah is a secretive organization and notoriously hard to penetrate. So far its leaders have been almost rabid in their declarations of support for Hamas; over the last few daysת their attacks on Israel have been increasing. They seem to be testing the waters—a dangerous game that may escalate שא any moment.

Syria and Iran?

Following twelve years of more or less intensive civil war, Syria hardly has any armed forces worth mentioning. Those it does have are busy fighting their domestic enemies. The Iranians provided political and logistic support and may have helped Hamas in planning the attack. Currently they are making all kinds threatening noises. However, and perhaps because they worry about a possible American threat and/or nuclear escalation, they seem to have done little to turn them into reality.

The rest of the Arab world?

The war presents the Arab governments with a dilemma. On one hand, ere hostilities started more and more of them were either signing peace with Israel or inching towards doing so. On the other hand, many have been feeling the pressure of their peoples which are less inclined to peace than their governments are. Should hostilities in and around Gaza continue, one may certainly expect negative political repercussions including, in cases where this is relevant, the breaking off of diplomatic relations. But war? Only in case Israel aces imminent collapse.

The international “system”?

Many countries are involved. Including, besides Lebanon, Syria and Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Russia, China, and the EU. The United States has promised to stand by Israel. However, the record—Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan (twice)—makes this promise look somewhat dubious. Russia/China are in league with Iran, but fortunately there are limits to what they can do. And the EU? Being Dutch, I shall use a Dutch expression to describe them: klootzakken (scrotums).  Hopeless cowards who can only talk.

Do you think this may be the beginning of a third world war?

I consider that a remote possibility. But yes, it could be. 

Returning to Israel and Hamas, who is going to win?

Victory means breaking the enemy’s will so that he ceases to resist. At the moment I cannot see this happening on either side; either they are too eager trying to exploit success (Hamas) or too busy licking their wounds and restoring the balance (Israel). Such being the case, Voltaire’s saying about the imaginary battle between Avars and Bulgars will apply. Both will sing mass, each in his own camp.

What can this struggle teach us about the future of war?

In my best-known book, The Transformation of War (1991) I argued that the future of war was guerrilla and terrorism. This prediction seems to be coming true, isn’t it?

In a rapidly changing world, each time s war breaks out the media are flooded with accounts of the technological marvels it has spawned. That is understandable; taking a longer point of view, though, one could argue that the most important lesson is that war still remains war. Includes its nature as a violent encounter between two (or more) belligerents, each of whom is at least partly free to do as he pleases; the enormous challenges, physical and mental, it poses to those who direct it and fight it; its roots in interest on one hand and sheer hatred on the other; its tendency to call out the most brutal  qualities of man and make them spread; its tendency to escalate and, doing so, escape not just political control but any kind of rational calculation; the role played by stealth, deception and surprise; its dependence on the social makeup of the societies that wage it; and many other things which, together, do as much as in shaping it as any number of computers, missiles and drones.

Or Worse

Once upon a time I was staying in a New York Hotel. Waking up and switching on the TV, I learnt that Israel and the group which, from then on, was to be recognized as the Palestinian Authority (PA) had reached an agreement designed to open the way towards what later became known as a “two-state solution” and full peace. Never in my life have I felt happier! The date? 13 September 1993.

Today, Thursday, is 14 September. So follow some Q&A about the Oslo Agreements, so called after the Norwegian capital where much of the negotiation process had taken place.

Who were the signatories of the Oslo Agreements?

On the Israeli side it was then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin; on the Palestinian one, PA chief Yasser Arafat.

What were the main points of the Oslo Agreements?

Given that the Agreements comprise over 300 pages containing 5 “chapters” with 31 “articles”, plus 7 “annexes” and 9 attached “maps,” this is a hard question to answer. Still, the following essentials are indispensable for any kind of understanding. First, the PA promised to give up terrorism, agreed to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and undertook to enter negotiations towards a “final” peace. 2. Israel recognized the PA as representing the Palestinian People and agreed to work with it in order to reach a peace agreement.  3. The West Bank was to be divided into three discontinuous zones. One under full Israeli control (both security and civilian), one under the joint control of Israel and the PA, and one under full Palestinian control; Israel’s security forces were to “redeploy” accordingly. 4. The various Palestinian paramilitary organizations then existing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were to be united under the authority of the PA and used to look after the security of those areas; no additional such organizations were to be recognized or newly established. 5. Israel and the PA were to work together in suppressing terrorism. 6. The agreements were deemed to be provisional, allowing five years for reaching a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 7. Both signatories would treat each other with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law, including an end to hostile propaganda and education.

Why did the Agreements fail?

One cardinal reason was the assassination by a Jewish terrorist of Prime Minister Rabin, the only Israeli with the authority to—perhaps—pull it off. Followed by his replacement, a few month later, by a series of more right-wing leaders—of whom the most important by far was Benjamin Netanyahu—who refused to do so.

That apart, almost from the beginning, both sides failed to act in the spirit, sometimes even the letter, of the Agreements. Though there were ups and downs the PA, either because it couldn’t or because it wouldn’t, never put an end to terrorism either in the West Bank of in the Gaza Strip.  Nor did it stop its propaganda against Israel. Israel on its part only redeployed its forces in a symbolic way, leaving both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (the latter, until 2006 when it finally withdrew its forces) under full military control.

More important still, three cardinal problems. They are, 1. The question of the settlements, now allegedly containing a population of 500,000, which Israel has built in the Territories and which it insists on eventually turning into part of its own sovereign territory. 2. The right of the Palestinians to return to the homes they were forced to leave back in 1948 and 1967, including not only those in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but in “old” Israel: too; and 3. The question of Jerusalem, which Israel insists must remain under its sole control and the PA demands be divided between the two sides.

And the future?

Bad for everyone. The Holy Land remains a not-so-dormant volcano ready to explode at any moment. To this, one might add the quite real possibility of Israel going up in flames as Left and Right battle each other over profound political, social and constitutional issues that are even now tearing it apart.

Meanwhile, for demographic and other reasons, both Israeli’s system of government and its public opinion have been moving steadily to the right. The younger the voter the more true this is, causing the future to look dark indeed. The worst scenario would be an attempt by some future Israeli right-wing government to use terrorism as an excuse to do away with what is left of the Agreement and expel the Palestinians of the West Bank in particular into what is now the Kingdom of Jordan. Such a move, akin to the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in 1948 and 1967, would very likely draw additional countries such as Iran, Lebanon and Syria into the fray. In addition, it would almost certainly nullify much of the progress that has been made towards a wider Israeli-Arab- and Israeli-Islamic peace. Feeling beleaguered on all sides, and possibly beset by civil war as well, Israel’s government, or what remains of it, might get to the point where it threatens using some of the 100-400 nuclear warheads which, according to various foreign sources, it has.

Or worse.

Quo Vadis, Israel

In my last post I tried to explain the nature and purpose of the various parties represented in Israel’s parliament (the Knesset). Consquently, a friend of mine, the award-winning painter Bob Barancik (see on him https://www.creativeshare.com/bio.php) confronted me with some questions of his own. So here are my answers—for what they are worth.

Q: Did the recent raft of insubordinations among reserve air force pilots and IDF officers permanently damage the security of the state against Iran and other hostile Arab states?

A: Possibly so. War being what it is, the most important factor in waging it is not technology, however sophisticated. It is, rather, fighting spirit which in turn can only rest on mutual trust (as people used to say when Germany still had an army, today it’s you, tomorrow it’s me). The way some Israeli pilots, flight controllers, drone-operators ground officers and of course lawyers see it, that trust has been violated by their political superiors who, by seeking to drastically increase the power of the executive in particular, are weakening the judiciary and preparing a dictatorship. This, on top of demanding that the police and the military resort to draconian measures to break the resistance of the occupied Palestinian population—so draconian that, should they be implemented, they have an excellent chance of causing those who carry them out to be dragged in front of the International Court for War Crimes in The Hague.

The problem is like cancer. The longer it persists, the worse it will become and the harder it will be to repair the damage already done.

Q: Could there realistically be a putsch orchestrated by IDF generals and/or security services to forcibly remove Netanyahu, Smotrich, Ben-Gvir from office?

A: I very much doubt it. Do not forget that the IDF, unlike most modern armed forces, is mainly made up not of professionals but of conscripts and reservists. They will be split in the middle, just like the rest of Israeli society. The outcome will be total disintegration.

Q: Could the Camp David Accords simply be ignored by Egypt and a return to old hostilities?

A: Such a move almost certainly will not come all at once but take time and psychological preparation among the masses. Also, an extreme provocation such as an Israeli attempt to expel the Palestinian population of the West Bank. But yes, it could happen.

Q: Do the Arab countries and Iran need Israel to continue to exist as a domestic “punching bag” or is the hatred so great that there could be a genocide of Israeli Jews ala Mufti of Jerusalem?

A: You ask as if Arabs and Iranians were made of the same piece. But they are not. Among the Arabs, the masses, including the better educated, hate Israel more than the government does. In Iran the situation is the opposite.

Incidentally, did it ever occur to you that things may also work the other way around—i.e that, vice vice versa, it is some Israeli circles that are using the threat as a punching bag?

Q: Is it likely that Hezbollah aka Iran will unleash a sustained barrage of missiles that would cripple Israeli infrastructure? Or will Israel’s nuclear capacity continue to deter the mullahs in the short run?

A: Israel has never published any nuclear doctrine it may have. At the same time, the general belief is that its leaders will only resort to nukes in case the country faces complete defeat—as by having its army reduced to the point where it can no longer fight, its logistic infrastructure knocked out, and a considerable part of its territory and population overrun.

With the worst will in the world, Hezbollah does not have what it takes to achieve these aims; so it will depend on Iranian (and Syrian) support. A bombardment with Iranian and Syrian chemical weapons might indeed lead Israel first to threaten and then use its weapons of last resort.

Q: Do you see an exodus of the “best and the brightest” if Bibi and company continue to hang on to power?

A: This is already happening. Many—no one knows just how many—academics, physicians, and other kinds of highly qualified experts are leaving or looking for ways to leave. The shekel, which for several years used to be called the strongest currency one earth, is falling. Tens of thousands, including some members of my own family, are trying to obtain foreign citizenship in addition to their Israeli one. While there are no statistics, my guess would be that there are few Israeli families left that have not considered this possibility more or less seriously.

Q: We live in the postmodern world, where everything is possible and almost nothing is certain.

A: How true. But it does not make forecasting the future any easier. If anything, to the contrary.

Q: Do you believe as someone said, that “This too shall pass”?

A: I think the threat is the most serious one Israel has faced since 1973. Unless very, very great care is taken by Netanyahu, his government and his successors civil war, not just between Jew and Arab but among the Jews themselves, is inevitable. Such a war, especially one that leads to foreign (Arab and Iranian) involvement, might very well mean, finis, Israel.

A Guide for the Perplexed

A Guide for the Perplexed is the title of a book written by the late twelfth-century Jewish physician, rabbi and philosopher Moshe Ben Maimon (known, to non-Jews, as Maimonides). Born and raised under Moslem rule in Spain, late in life he moved to Morocco and Jerusalem before settling in Cairo where he took a prominent part in communal life before dying in 1204.  The book, written in Arabic but making use of Hebrew letters, deals with some of the most fundamental issues surrounding Judaism and religion in general. Such as God’s existence, His attributes, His relationship with the world, the ways in which He may be known, the question of necessity versus freedom, and so on. At a time when Israeli politics are hitting the headlines, I shall use its title to explain the smorgasbord of squabbling  parties currently represented in Israel’s 120-member, unicameral, parliament (the Knesset).

Likud (Cohesion). Various parent-parties of Likud go back to the mid-1930s when it was set up as a right-wing, bourgeois counterweight to the dominant Labor Party. Beginning in 1977 it has won most elections and had two of its leaders (Menahem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir) serve as prime ministers.  Starting in 1993 it has been led Benjamin Netanyahu on a hawkish platform whose main tenets are a free (well, more or less) enterprise economy and the determination to retain the occupied territories at almost any cost. Ordinarily one would expect such a party to attract the comfortably off; in fact however, most of its support comes from “the poor and the praying” as Begin once put it. Currently it has 32 seats in the Knesset.

Yesh Atid (There is a Future). Founded by  brilliant journalist and author, Yair Lapid as recently as 2012, Yesh Atid has been running on a more secular platform than that of Likud. Indeed Lapid’s time as prime minister, which lasted from mid 2022 to late in the same year, was in some ways the best in the country’s entire history. Like all parties to the left of Likud, Yesh Atid has proclaimed  its strong desire for some kind of peace with the Palestinians in particular. Also like all parties to the left of Likud, neither it nor its leaders have the slightest idea how this could be achieved. Currently it has 24 seats and is the largest opposition party.

Tikvah Hadasha (New Hope).  Founded by a former minister of defense, General (ret) Benjamin Gantz, currently this party commands 12 Knesset seats and forms part of the opposition. Yet personalities apart, just how it differs from Yesh Atid and why has not joined the latter no one knows.

Shas (short for, Guardians of the Six books of the Talmud). An orthodox-religious party that appeals mainly to the Sephardi poor and  less well educated.  Founded around 1980, since then it has acted as Likud’s more or less  faithful partner in setting up various governments. Forming part of Netanyahu’s coalition, at the moment it has 11 Knesset members. Known mainly for its loathing of everything Ashkenazi as well as the corruption which has caused several of its leaders to spend time in prison.

Religious Zionism. Until 1977 this party regularly teamed up with the dominant left, forming various successive governments and keeping itself busy with such things as kosher food (a great source of income for rabbis, incidentally) and public transportation on the Shabbat. Since then, however, it has turned sharply to the right, gaining support among the West Bank settlers in particular on a platform which in many ways reminds one of Mussolini’s Fascism. Currently it occupies 7 Knesset seats and is a member of Netanyahu’s coalition

United Torah Judaism. Sharply divided between Ashkenazis and Sephardis, this party represents the ultra- orthodox. With currently 7 Knesset seats, it is doing what it can to join Shas in turning Israel into a sort of Jewish Iran. Complete with every kind of restriction on non-kosher food, gay and lesbian and trans life, abortion, public transportation on the Shabbat, and even the right of men and women to enjoy the same beaches, the same swimming pools, and the same pavements.

Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) currently commands 6 Knesset seats. Led by a former rowdy, it has long specialized in mounting pogroms against Arabs, both Palestinian and Israeli ones. If any group has the potential to turn Israel into a Nazi-like state and society, complete with “resident aliens” (Arabs who agree to being relegated to second-rate status without political rights) and expulsion (of Arab who do not) it is this one.

Israel Beiteinu (Israel, Our Home).  A leftover from the 1990s, when there were several parties claiming to represent freshly arrived immigrants from the former USSR, originally this party took a strong right-wing anti-Arab, stance. Commanding 7-8 Knesset seats, at one point it was sufficiently powerful for its leader, Avigdor Lieberman to, claim and obtain a post as minister of defense under Netanyahu (2016-18). Starting in 2022, though, its influence began to decline. Left in command of just 6 seats, it has drifted into the opposition, focusing mainly on preventing the state from being taken over by the Orthodox parties.

Two Israeli Arab parties, one Islamic/conservative, one (relatively) modern and liberal, commanding 10 seats between them and forming part of the opposition.

Labor Party. Representing the sad remnants of a party that used to rule Israel for decades. With 4 seats at its command Labor, like most of the rest, professes its strong desire for peace with the Palestinians without however, having the slightest idea of how to achieve it or even whether it can be achieved at all. Since this is completely unrealistic, it peddles an Israel version of Wokeness. As a result its appeal is limited, especially among the orthodox and the “traditional” (moderately religious) who, together, form about 60 percent of the overall population.

Noam (Niceness) a one-MK version of National Zionism without the latter’s violent edge.

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As in other countries, all these parties claim to be motivated solely by the public good.

As in other countries, all these parties claim to be peace-loving.

As in other countries, they need a powerful judiciary to keep their ambitions in check.

As in other countries, a plague on all their houses.

As in other countries, a democratic regime cannot do without them.

In the Middle East, the Alarm Bells are Ringing

In the Middle East, the alarm bells are ringing. In this post I shall make an effort to explain, first, why this is so; and second, what a war might look like.

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In the Middle East, the alarms bells are ringing. There are several reasons for this, all of them important and all well-able to combine with each other and give birth to the largest conflagration the region has witnessed in decades. The first is the imminent demise of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, alias Abu Maazen. Now 88 years old, his rule started in 2005 when he took over from Yasser Arafat. Unlike Arafat, who began his career as the leader of a terrorist organization, Abu Mazen was and remains primarily a politician and a diplomat. In this capacity he helped negotiate the 1995 Oslo Agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Movement. Partly for that reason, partly because he opposed his people’s armed uprising (the so-called Second Intifada of 2000-2003) some Israelis saw him as a more pliant partner than his predecessor had been.

It did not work that way. Whether through his own fault, or that of Israel, or both, during all his eighteen years in office Abu Mazen has failed to move a single step closer to a peace settlement. Israel on its part has never stopped building new settlements and is doing so again right now. As a result, Palestinian terrorism and Israeli retaliatory measures in the West Bank in particular are once again picking up, claiming dead and injured almost every day.

Nor is the West Bank the only region where Israelis and Palestinians keep clashing. Just a few weeks have passed since the death, in an Israeli jail and as a result of a hunger strike, of a prominent Palestinian terrorist. His demise made the Islamic Jihad terrorist organization in Gaza launch no fewer than a thousand rockets at Israel, leading to Israeli air strikes, leading to more rockets, and so on in the kind of cycle that, over the last twenty years or so, has become all too familiar. Fortunately Hezbollah, another Islamic terrorist organization whose base is Lebanon, did not intervene. It is, however, not at all certain that, should hostilities in and around Gaza resume, it won’t follow up on its leader’s threats to do just that. Certainly it has the capability and the plans; all that is needed is a decision.

Israel armed forces are among the most powerful in the world. In particular, its anti-aircraft, anti-missile, and anti-aircraft defenses are unmatched anywhere else. It may take time and here will be casualties. Still, unless something goes very, very wrong, Israel should be able to silence not just the Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah but another terrorist organization operating out of Gaza, i.e Hamas, too. If not completely and forever, then at any rate partially and for some time to come.

However, two factors threaten to upset this nice calculation. The first is the possibility that, as hostilities escalate, the Kingdom of Jordan will be drawn into the fray just as it was both during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and then during its 1967 successor. With Palestinians now comprising a very large—just how large no one, perhaps not even the Jordanians themselves, knows—percentage of the kingdom’s population, there is a good chance that the ruling Hashemite House will not be able to remain on the sidelines. Either it joins the fight, or it risks being overthrown.  Nobody knows this better than the Hashemites themselves. From the king down, not for nothing have some of them been buying property, including both real estate and stock, abroad. Currently Jordan is an oasis of stability and not at war with any of its neighbors. Should the regime fall and leave a behind failed state, though, it is likely that terrorists from all over the Middle East will flock to establish themselves there, setting off the powder keg.

The other possibility is more ominous still. Over the years Iran has been assisting various Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, providing them with money, weapons, logistics, training and more. In response Israel has been using its anti-aircraft defenses to bring down Iranian drones and its air force, to hit Iranian targets in Syria. As of today Iran lacks some of the elements that make up a modern air force, specifically including the all-important early warning systems. On the other hand, it does have the ballistic missiles and the drones it needs to reach and hit any Israeli target. Now Iran is a large country with 0.63 million square miles of land and a population of almost 87 million. Defeating it, if only to the extent of making it cease hostilities for the time being, will take more than just a few Israeli air strikes, however well planned, however precise, and however well executed.

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To recapitulate, in the Middle East quiet, or as much of it as there is, is hanging by a thread. Israel, the occupied West Bank, the unoccupied Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iran are all at imminent risk of war. Not just with each other but, in at least some cases, war combined with struggles against all kinds of terrorist organizations. As history shows, wars of the second kind are particularly likely to last for years and end, to the extent they ever do, in chaos. All this, before we even consider the role nuclear weapons, both those Iran may develop and deploy and those Israel already has, may play.