Russian Policy toward the Korean Peninsula, 1991-2001

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In July of 2000, Russian Federation (RF) President Vladimir Putin spent two days in Pyongyang, North Korea, the first Russian (or Soviet) head of state ever to visit that country. Newly elected President in his own right in March 2000, Putin wasted no time promoting his East Asia foreign policy agenda, including presidential visits to South Korea, China, and elsewhere in the region within the past year.

Indeed, it is fair to say that Russian foreign policy has undergone a major sea change over the past five years. Between 1991-1995, the RF clearly was preoccupied with improving relations with western Europe and the United States. Yel 'tsin worked hard to bring his country fully into the G-7 group of industrialized nations, succeeding in June 1997 in having the G-7 officially renamed the G-8. (Since that 1997 meeting in Denver, Russia has attended the annual political but not the economic meetings of the Group.) In January 1996, however, Andrei Kozyrev, the western-focused "architect" of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy, was replaced as Foreign Minister by Evgenii Primakov (former head of Soviet foreign intelligence), and Russian policy shifted rather quickly to one focusing on East Asia and the Third World, and on Asiatic Russia (east of the Urals) in addition to European Russia. Two-thirds of Russia lies east of the Urals, although only a small percentage of its population lives in that vast territory.

Foreign policy did not undergo substantial change with the appointment of Igor Ivanov as Foreign Minister to succeed Primakov when the latter was confirmed as Prime Minister in 1998. The post-1995 "disillusionment" with Europe and the U.S. resulted in good measure from Russia's belief that the West had failed to provide the financial support that the country needed—and deserved—in order to

move successfully from a command to a market-oriented economy and from an authoritarian to a democratic political system. Further, Russian political leaders were unhappy with the recent expansion of NATO membership to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic: the three were invited for membership despite strong Russian objections, and it is highly likely that NATO membership will be further extended within the next few years, with the possibility of one or more former Soviet republics (the Baltic states) being invited to join in addition to several Central European countries formerly under communist rule (Slovakia, Slovenia and, possibly, Romania).

While foreign policy can never be divorced from domestic considerations, and understanding a country's foreign policy requires an extensive understanding also of that country's domestic affairs and the interconnections between the two, I believe Russian foreign policy in the first decade after the collapse and disappearance of the USSR among the world's countries (and one of two superpowers at that) cannot be understood without substantial knowledge of the Russian domestic political scene and the continuing struggle that Russia's leaders have had in trying to move their country toward a democratically based political system with a market-oriented economy. Indeed, Russia's first president, Boris Yel'tsin, spoke of Russia's continuing struggle in his last speech to the nation as president on December 31, 1999, when he resigned in order to "create a most important precedent . . . the civilized voluntary transfer of power, power from one president of Russia to another, elected anew."[1] Yel'tsin asked for Russia's forgiveness:

> **I want to apologize for not making many of our dreams come true. What had seemed easy turned out to be extremely difficult. I apologize for not justifying some of the expectations of people who believed that we could jump in one swoop from the gray, stagnant, totalitarian past to the bright, prosperous, civilized future. I believed in it myself. It seemed that if we could just make one jump, we would overcome everything.**
> **But the one jump didn't work. . . . In some areas the problems turned out to be far too complicated. We slogged ahead through these mistakes, through these failures...}**

The political history of the Russian Federation from December 1991 to the present has been one characterized by the domination of domestic concerns, and foreign policy seems to have been designed largely to assist perceived domestic needs. Thus, the early post-Soviet efforts to enhance relations with the West were dictated largely by

Russia's need for western loans and investment, as state-owned industries were slated for privatization. Russia counted on major financial support not only from members of the European Common Market (later Union) as well as the United States, but also from western-dominated financial institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund. Russia received massive loans during the 1990s, sometimes coupled with requirements for strengthening private ownership or fledgling democratic institutions, but the loans did not serve to anchor the country's economy; at the same time, with few exceptions, European and American corporations were unwilling to invest substantially in Russia's economy for a variety of business reasons, including a shaky legal system, a vague tax system, and demands that a significant percentage of the profits produced by Russian companies with foreign investment remain in the country.

The Gorbachev Foreign Policy Legacy: In Brief

During most of the Gorbachev era (1985-91), Soviet foreign policy was focused largely on improving relations with the major powers, particularly China and the United States. (Indeed, one of Mikhail Gorbachev's greatest triumphs in international diplomacy occurred when he was invited to join the G-7 group of industrialized nations for the first time at their 1990 annual meeting.) Atthe same time, however, the Soviet leader clearly believed it was in his country's interests to pay greater attention to the Soviet role in East Asia than had his predecessors and to establish the USSR as a major player in that region. Accordingly, in a major foreign policy speech in Vladivostok (in July 1986), the CPSU General Secretary emphasized the importance of Asia and the Pacific to Soviet security. The Soviet Union was concerned about a growing U.S.-South Korean-Japanese military alliance aimed at North Korea and possibly the USSR. In the last years of the Cold War, however, when both the U.S. and the USSR were reaching out diplomatically to countries with which they had never before had relations, the Soviets realized that South Korea, with its booming economy and accompanying foreign loan and investment possibilities, could assist the USSR economically in ways that North Korea clearly could not. And, with relations between the USSR and China improving steadily and rapidly, it no longer seemed to matter to the Soviets whether the North Koreans tilted more toward China or toward the Soviet Union, because the three-decade-old rivalry between the two communist-ruled powers had finally been brought to an end.

Soviet policy toward both Koreas changed dramatically during Gorbachev's years in power and first became public in 1988 when the

Soviets decided to send athletes as well as the BoPshoi Ballet to participate in that year's Olympic Games in Seoul. Despite repeated invitations from then North Korean leader Kim II Sung, Gorbachev refused to visit Pyongyang, although an ideal opportunity arose in May 1989 when the Soviet leader visited China. (Reportedly, Gorbachev had promised Kim that he would return the latter's 1986 visit to Moscow "at a convenient time," but he never did.) Soviet-South Korean relations developed rapidly, with the Soviets opening a trade office in Seoul in the spring of 1989, and Kim Young Sam (soon to be elected President of the Republic of Korea—ROK—South Korea) visited Moscow in June of that year. Further, Soviet trade with South Korea increased substantially from 1986 on. For example, the volume of bilateral trade in 1986 was $133 million; the following year, it had jumped to $200 million.[3] Gorbachev met with ROK President Roh Tae Woo in San Francisco in June 1990, and three months later, in September, the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the ROK was established. Together with the establishment of diplomatic relations came agreement on a $3 billion loan from South Korea, to be provided over three years; $2 billion would be made available to the Soviets for purchase of South Korean consumer goods at attractive prices, and the remaining $1 billion would be used for Soviet industrial development. The Soviets agreed to repay the loan partly in raw materials, particularly coal and natural gas, which South Korea sorely needed. (By 1993, Russia had negotiated with the South Koreans to sell them military equipment as a way of partially repaying the loans.[4])

When then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze flew to Pyongyang in early September 1990 to inform the North Koreans of the impending establishment of diplomatic relations between his country and South Korea, Kim II Sung refused to meet with him. Relations between the Soviets and North Koreans had deteriorated after 1988, at least in part because Soviet leaders had begun to pressure their North Korean counterparts to reform their economy, which Kim staunchly refused to consider. North Korea labeled the normalization of Soviet-South Korean relations "an act of betrayal" on the part of the Soviets. "The USSR, by its actions, joins the conspiracy of the United States and South Korea aiming at the destruction of the socialist system in the North," declared the North Korean Foreign Ministry.[5]

Shevardnadze confirmed after his visit that beginning in January 1991, the North Koreans would be obliged to pay for all Soviet goods in hard currency only (rather than through barter arrangements, as had been the norm), and also would have to pay at prevailing world market prices, rather than at significantly lower CMEA (Council on Mutual

Economic Assistance—the communist-ruled countries' economic counterpart to the European Common Market) rates, for Soviet oil and gas deliveries. Because of North Korea's heavy dependence on oil from the USSR, the latter agreed in April 1991 to postpone mandatory payments in hard currency until the following year.[6] Trade between the two countries declined drastically in 1991; just two years earlier, Soviet-North Korean trade had reached an all-time high of $2.5 billion. According to one source, in 1989 the North received 63 percent of its electric power, 50 percent of its coal and refined oil, and 33 percent of its steel from the Soviets.[7] While Russian-DPRK bilateral trade increased somewhat during the mid-'90s, Russia for a number of years has no longer been one of the DPRK's top three trading partners. Indeed, by 1995 Russia had dropped to fifth place among North Korea's trading partners, with Russia accounting for only four percent of total trade turnover.[8]

YePtsin's Korea Policies

With the collapse of communist rule in the Soviet Union after the aborted August 1991 coup, and the final disintegration of the USSR in December of that year, foreign policymaking was temporarily put on hold until the new states formed out of the former USSR could agree upon a division of the international assets and responsibilities of that country. By the summer of 1992, Yel'tsin announced that his country would take responsibility for the continuity of Soviet foreign policy into the post-Soviet era. During that same year, Yel'tsin made official visits to both South Korea (where he was invited to address the South Korean parliament) and China. In his November 1992 visit to Seoul, Yel'tsin and South Korean President Roh signed a Treaty on Principles of Relations between Russia and the ROK, as well as a Memorandum of Understanding for Military Exchanges, which has resulted in exchanges of military information and personnel and, as mentioned earlier, in massive Russian sales of military defense technology and equipment (as a way of paying back Soviet loans agreed upon when diplomatic relations between the ROK and the USSR were established).

In June 1994, ROK President Kim Young Sam visited Moscow and reportedly agreed to postpone Russia's debt payments in exchange for a commitment by Yel'tsin to oppose North Korea's growing nuclear weapons program.[9] Indeed, in the previous year, the Russian government had pressured the North Koreans into guaranteeing their compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty and had stopped delivery of three nuclear plants that had been promised earlier. Russia also recalled about 160 of its nuclear scientists and missile specialists from the DPRK, who reportedly were assisting

the North Koreans with military programs, and in mid-1994, Yel'tsin told the North Koreans that Russia would support international sanctions against them if they pursued a nuclear weapons program.[10] The Russian president also signed an executive order freezing a $4 billion project, which included three light water nuclear reactors that were to be built for the North Koreans at Sinpo.[11]

The possibility of an official state visit to North Korea was never raised publicly (although it may have been discussed privately) and, during his two terms in office, Yel'tsin never visited the DPRK nor met with either Kim II Sung or his successor (and son), Kim Jong-il. Relations between Russia and the DPRK after 1991 deteriorated rapidly. Within a year, Russia had withdrawn all its technicians working in the North under contract, mainly at industrial defense sites, because of the DPRK's inability to pay them in hard currency. At the same time, the Russians pressed North Korea to begin to repay its $3.5 billion debt, accumulated over many years, because the new Russian state badly needed hard currency. This, coupled with the North Koreans' inability after 1991 to buy Russian oil and natural gas to help satisfy fuel and energy needs (because of the requirement that they pay in hard currency—which they didn't have), contributed substantially to the North's precipitous economic decline during the 1990s, from which it is just now beginning to recover.[12] Russian-DPRK trade fell precipitously in 1991 and, from 1992 on, China became North Korea's main trading partner.

The fate of the thirty-year Soviet-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, signed in 1961, remained vague during the 1990s. The treaty's terms stated that if either party did not raise objections, the treaty was to be automatically renewed for five years and, accordingly, apparently remained in force until 1996. Beginning in 1992, however, there were numerous reports the Russians had initiated discussions about "updating" the treaty and eliminating the clause stating that if either side were attacked, the other would come immediately to its defense. During his visit to South Korea in November 1992, Yel'tsin promised to revise the Soviet-DPRK Treaty and, soon thereafter, reportedly, the Russians told North Korea that they would only come to the latter's defense if it were attacked "without provocation," although they assured the DPRK that it would remain under the Russian nuclear umbrella. Pyongyang responded that the Russians "need not concern themselves about the North's security."[13] By 1996, it was clear that the Russians would not automatically provide military support to the North regardless of the reasons the latter was attacked,[14] and negotiations over a new treaty were begun. According to V. I. Denisov, Russia's current ambassador

to the DPRK, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov's April 1996 visit to Pyongyang and his meetings with North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Lee In Gue were designed to rekindle the dialogue and improve relations between the two countries.[15] Two Russian State Duma (parliament) delegations, one in 1996 headed by Duma Speaker (and leading RF Communist Party member) Gennadii Seleznev, and the other in 1997, headed by Vladimir Lukin, chair of the Duma's International Affairs Committee, seemed designed to continue an effort to normalize relations between the two countries and also to indicate that the Russian legislature, if not the executive branch, was interested in improving relations with the DPRK. In January 1997, Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Karazin made an official visit to North Korea to begin extended discussions on a new treaty,[16] which was signed in February 2000 and soon ratified by the parliaments of both countries.

During Yel'tsin's years as president of the Russian Federation, his focus was overwhelmingly on Russian domestic affairs.[17] Russia's enormous domestic challenge, beginning at independence in late 1991, to establish some form of democratic rule (without collapsing into either civil war or revolution) after literally centuries of dictatorial or authoritarian rule, cannot be overstated. And, at the same time, Russia was faced with an equally enormous challenge of trying to move from a state (Party)-directed command economy to a market-oriented one, again with no historical experience of a free market economy. Gorbachev had tried desperately between 1986 and 1991 to introduce major political and then economic reforms and had failed miserably, so miserably in fact that his country had literally disintegrated and disappeared by December 1991. The Russian Federation, as was the USSR, is a multinational country, although 82 percent of its population is ethnically Russian (in contrast to 53 percent of the former USSR having been composed of ethnic Russians); its constituent non-Russian republics signed a new, hastily designed Federation Treaty in 1992, but the new country continues to face many of the same problems of political cohesion as had the former Soviet Union, and the real possibility of political disintegration cannot be ruled out. Within this context, Russian foreign policymaking in the first decade after communist rule understandably has not taken center stage, and has been designed mainly to protect the country's national security interests.

Russia's Current East Asia Policy

In 1991, just prior to the collapse of the USSR, the Soviets agreed to provide North Korea with three 660-megawatt light-water (nuclear)

reactors (LWR), for which the latter was to pay in hard currency; in spring 1993, when the field work necessary to construct the nuclear plants was nearing completion, the DPRK announced it was unable to pay. At the same time, the North Koreans announced their withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), whereupon Yel'tsin signed an executive order suspending the LWR project[18]

Left out of major international negotiations with North Korea on various security issues affecting the Korean peninsula, particularly negotiations over North Korea's developing nuclear weapons program, the U.S.-North Korean agreement on restricting DPRK nuclear activities through the creation of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization KEDO project, and the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two Koreas, Russia recently has sought to reassert its role in Northeast Asia and establish itself as a major player in East Asian affairs. Moscow's offer to KEDO to build and supply several light water reactors for North Korea was rejected early on (in favor of South Korea's supplying the reactors) by the major KEDO participants (U.S., South Korea, and Japan), and Russia subsequently backed away from the project altogether. Since the Four Power (U.S., China, North and South Korea) Talks on working toward a settlement between the two Koreas began in the mid-1990s, the Russians have sought unsuccessfully to expand the discussions to include themselves and Japan, thereby creating Six-Power Talks, and also have proposed Eight-Power Talks, which would include the U.N and the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA) in addition to the six countries.

Russia successfully improved relations with China during the 1990s, building on Gorbachev's earlier efforts. Yel'tsin and other high-level Russian officials have made regular state visits to China, and Chinese President Jiang Zemin, as well as Chinese political and military officials, regularly returned these visits to Russia. With respect to Japan, Yel'tsin seemed particularly interested in finally settling the two countries' territorial dispute and concluding a peace treaty formally ending World War II hostilities, but he was not able to reach an agreement with the Japanese before he resigned from office in December 1999. His chosen successor, Vladimir Putin, a career state security officer turned reformer (who headed the Russian Federal Security Service prior to his appointment as Acting President in December 1999), seems less willing to negotiate with the Japanese generally and not willing to consider any agreement that would end Russia's continued control over the four disputed southern Kurile islands. Visits by Russian and Japanese high-ranking officials to each other's country were repeatedly postponed during the past year, and the

signing of a Russo-Japanese peace treaty does not appear imminent.

In February 2000, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov became the first high-level Russian official to visit North Korea since the collapse of the USSR. His visit was preceded by a non-publicized two-week visit to Moscow by Kim Young Nam, former DPRK Foreign Minister and currently head of the DPRK's Supreme Peoples' Council Standing Committee and KWP Politburo member, who officially was in Moscow for eye surgery. While in the Russian capital, Kim Young Nam reportedly met with Russian foreign ministry officials to discuss improved North Korean ties with Russia.[19] (Russia delivered ten tons of food to the DPRK "as a goodwill gesture" at the start of Ivanov's visit.[20]) In Pyongyang, Ivanov and his DPRK counterpart, Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun, signed the Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighborliness, and Cooperation, in which both countries agreed "not to conclude any treaty or agreement with a third country nor join in its action or step if they stand against sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of either of the parties."[21]

President Putin's Northeast Asia policy currently appears to have three major objectives: (1) to ensure continued stability on the Korean peninsula; (2) to limit U.S. (and Japanese) influence in Northeast Asia and, at the same time, increase Russian influence there; and (3) to encourage significant foreign economic investment (from South Korea, China, and Japan) in eastern Siberia, a region incidentally that has been only loosely controlled, if at all, by Moscow since the collapse of the USSR. More generally, Russia wants to avoid a political or economic collapse in North Korea and wants to reassert Russia's role as an important player on the Korean peninsula.

Since he was elected to the presidency in March 2000 with a decisive margin of victory, Putin has traveled to Beijing to secure Chinese support against America's proposed National Missile Defense (NMD) system, and to Pyongyang and Hanoi, in part for the same purpose. Putin's two-day visit on July 19-20, 2000, to Pyongyang marked the first time a Soviet or Russian leader had ever visited that country, and the Russian President seemed eager to increase his country's influence on the Korean peninsula in light of the unprecedented meeting between the South and North Korean heads of state in Pyongyang the previous month. He visited Seoul in March 2001 to encourage South Korean economic and financial support for projects in eastern Siberia, as well as support for reconnecting the Korean railway between the South and North which, in turn, will link to Russia's Trans-Siberian railroad. The advantages for Russia are clear: transporting goods from China and Northeast Asia to Europe by train across Russia will provide the latter important revenue and boost the

economy of numerous cities and towns along the route. It also will save Asian shippers considerable time and expense. Russia will invest several hundred million U.S. dollars for renovation of the railway in the DPRK, Putin declared, but will need additional financial resources for the project.

At the end of their July summit meeting, Putin and Kim Jong-il "adopted an 11-point declaration on domestic and international issues of mutual concern."[22] Putin also managed to secure North Korean agreement "to shut down its missile program if other nations provide it with rocket boosters for space exploration." The Russian President said he believed the elimination of a North Korean missile capability would "render groundless" the U.S. position that a NMD system was needed because of a "DPRK missile threat."[23] Putin and Kim Jong-il also discussed the reestablishment of economic ties and the possibility of Russian technicians assisting North Korea in refurbishing and modernizing major industrial plants that originally were built with Soviet assistance in the 1960s and '70s.[24] Because the DPRK cannot pay for substantial Russian assistance, and the RF cannot afford to provide support without repayment, the latter is eager to interest Japan and South Korea in providing loans.[25] Reportedly, North Korean officials supplied their Russian counterparts with a list of goods they could export to the RF as partial repayment, but the Russians declared most of them of no interest.[26]

Just after Putin's visit, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il reportedly planned to visit the Russian Far East to help jump-start economic and trade relations between his country and Russia. Yevgenii Nazdratenko, then Governor of Russia's Primorskiy krai (which borders North Korea), was among those in Putin's North Korean visit entourage and had proposed several joint economic undertakings between his region and the North, as well as agreements to expand the number of North Korean guest workers (now estimated at 15,000 to 25,000) in Siberian logging camps and an additional ("undetermined") number working in construction projects in the Russian Far East.[27] This visit did not materialize, and Putin managed to secure Nazdratenko' s resignation the following February.[28]

Kim Jong-il's mid-April 2001 scheduled visit (in which he reportedly was going to talk with Putin before undertaking any discussions between his country and the new administration in Washington) also did not materialize, although Minister of Defense Kim II Choi visited Moscow in late April, met with his Russian counterpart as well as with Foreign Minister Ivanov, and signed two agreements on bilateral military cooperation. In late July and early August 2001, Kim Jong-il finally visited Russia, traveling from

Pyongyang to Moscow and St. Petersburg aboard a 21-car armored train. Leaving Pyongyang on July 26, he made several stops along the way, including an unscheduled one at Lake Baikal, reportedly so he could dip a hand into its crystal-clear waters. Kim spent two days in the western Siberian city of Omsk, where he visited a T-80 tank factory, the Omsk Bacon Company, and the Pushkin State Scientific Library, where he inspected its rare book collection.[29]

Arriving in Moscow in early August, Kim met with President Putin and the two signed an eight point Declaration, issued on August 4, committing "the DPRK and Russia to the 'formation of a new fair world order' framed by international law and beyond the domination of any single power."[30] The North Korean leader promised to suspend ballistic missile launchings until 2003, and agreed with Putin that the 1972 ABM Treaty should remain the foundation of arms control efforts. Reportedly, Putin told Kim that Russia would consider supplying satellite-launch rockets to North Korea, but would insist on payment, either from the DPRK or another country.[31] Russia also agreed to provide support for modernizing North Korea's railway stock, training DPRK railway engineers, linking Russia's Trans-Siberian Railroad to the North Korea rail line, and assisting with the reconnection of the inter-Korean rail line (which will include detection and elimination of land mines near the rail line in the DMZ between the two Koreas).

Kim also traveled to St. Petersburg, where he discussed the opening of a trade office between that city and Pyongyang, and toured shipbuilding, road construction, lumber equipment manufacture, and oil and gas system sites.[32]

Although North Korea continues to be primarily concerned with its bilateral relationship with the U.S., Kim clearly wanted to gain Russian support for a number of projects, including (1) support when it bargains with the United States over nuclear and missile issues; (2) increased military assistance, including spare parts for existing weaponry as well as new, technologically advanced armaments; (3) provision of "reliable, long-term deliveries of Russian oil and gas"; and (4) assistance in developing economic cooperation between the North and other countries of the former Soviet Union, especially those in Central Asia.[33]

For its part, Russia wants to confirm its role as the prime intermediary between North Korea and the United States and, accordingly, as an important player in any political settlement on the Korean peninsula.

Conclusion

Russian policy toward the Korean peninsula and toward Northeast

Asia has changed substantially during the past decade. For the first half of the decade, Russia was much more concerned with extending relations with South Korea than with the North and, more specifically, with ensuring continued economic and financial assistance from the ROK. The Russian government was determined to enhance relations with China (which it did) and to improve relations with Japan leading to agreement on a peace treaty (which it did not achieve). With respect to East Asian policy, Yel'tsin's foreign policy seemed to focus more on specific countries and targets of opportunity than on the region as a whole. Since 1996, however, Northeast Asia as a region has become more important to Moscow and, since 1999, North Korea and the whole Korean peninsula have become increasingly important.

Since March 2000, when he was elected president of Russia, Putin has spent a great deal of time traveling, much of it abroad. He has made state visits to China, the DPRK, the ROK, Vietnam, Malaysia, and other southeast Asian nations. Clearly, he wants to extend Russian influence in East Asia and, at the same time, counteract U.S. and Japanese influence on the Korean peninsula and elsewhere in East Asia. For the moment, he is especially eager to line up allies against the U.S.-proposed national missile defense system. More broadly, he seeks to revitalize Russian (formerly Soviet) influence around the world, particularly in the developing world. Thus far, judging from both his domestic and foreign policy priorities, Putin seems determined to recapture some of the great power status that was lost when the USSR collapsed, which Yel'tsin for many reasons was not able to do.

Notes

1. Boris Yel'tsin, *Midnight Diaries* (New York: Public Affairs/Pegasus, 2000), p. 386.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 387.
3. Evgeniy P. Bazhanov, "Russia's Policies Toward the Two Koreas," in Wonmo Dong, ed., *The Two Koreas and the United States* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 151. By 1995, trade volume between the two had risen to $3 billion.
4. See my essay, "Soviet and Russian Relations with the Two Koreas," *International Journal of Korean Studies,* I, 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 215-229.
5. Young Whan Kihl, "North Korea's Foreign Relations: Diplomacy of Promotive Adaptation," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies,* X, 3 (Fall 1991), p.34.
6. Robert A. Scalapino, "Korea in the Cold War and its Aftermath," in Robert S. Ross, ed., *East Asia in Transition* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 214. Scalapino cites a "Soviet foreign ministry official who had accompanied Shevardnadze to Pyongyang" as his source.
7. Zacek, *International Journal of Korean Studies, op. cit*^ p. 223.
8. For example, in 1990, the Soviets delivered 410,000 metric tons of oil to North Korea; in 1991, 100 metric tons less than 25 percent of the previous year were

delivered. Zacek, "Russia in North Korean Foreign Policy," in Samuel Kim, ed., *North Korea's Foreign Relations in the post-Cold War Era* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 82 and footnote.

9. Bazhanov in Dong, ed., *op. ciL,* p. 156.

10. *Ibid.,* pp. 157-158.

11. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Russia's Relations with North Korea," in Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., *Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 170. See also Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, and Koji Watanabe, eds., *Russia and East Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).

12. According to Doug Struck ("North Korea Back from the Brink," *The Washington Post,* September 5, 2000), "The DPRK economy is growing for the first time in nine years and the mass starvation of the past five years is largely over . ..." See also an Associated Press Report from Seoul (ROK), July 30, 1999, which stated that ROK officials believe the North Korean economy began to turn around in 1998.

13. Andrew A. Bouchkin, "North Korea and Russia: A Blind Alley?" in Doug Joong Kim, ed., *Foreign Relations of North Korea during Kim II Sung's Last Days* (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1994), p. 315.

14. *Newsreview* (Seoul), September 14, 1996.

15. V. I. Denisov, "Russia and the Problem of Korean Unification," in Tae-Hwan Kwak, ed., *The Four Powers and Korean Unification Strategies* (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 1997), p. 40.

16. Bazhanov in Wonmo Dong, ed., *op. cit,* p. 162.

17. In his memoirs of his last years in office, *Midnight Diaries,* (New York: Public Affairs/Perseus, 2000), Yel'tsin writes almost exclusively about domestic affairs, suggesting that he was preoccupied with these and much less so with foreign affairs.

18. Seong-Ho Joo, "DPRK-Russian Rapprochement and its Implications for Korean Security," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies,* vol. 9, No. 1 (2000), p. 211.

19. Hwang Seong-joon, "North Korean Politburo Head Visits Moscow," *Choson Ilbo* (Seoul, in English), December 30,1999. For a detailed chronology of visits by Russian officials (both executive and legislative) to North Korea, see Seung-Ho Joo, "DPRK-Russian Rapprochement and its Implications for Korean Security," *op. cit.,* pp. 193-223.

20. Dmitry Skosyrev, "Moscow has Renovated its Treaty with Pyongyang," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta,* February 10, 2000.

21. Agence France-Presse, Seoul, "North Korea and Russia End Cold War Alliance with New Pact," February 9, 2000.

22. Ko Jae-nam, "The Russia-North Korea Summit and Beyond: The Role of Russia on the Korean Peninsula," *East Asian Review.* 12, 3 (Autumn 2000), p. 6. According to Agence France-Presse, Ivanov invited Paek to visit Russia and the latter agreed, although no specific date was set. (AF-P, Seoul, February 14, 2000)

23. *Ibid.,* "North Korea Pledges to Give Up Missile Program in Landmark Putin Visit," July 19, 2000. See also David Hoffman, "Russian Outlines some Options in North Korean Missile Proposal," *The Washington Post,* July 23, 2000.

24. Associated Press, Seoul, "Putin Raises Question of North Korean Missiles with Kim Jong II," July 19, 2000.

25. Dmitry Kosyrev, "New Policy for Asia," *Dipkuryer N G* (in English), February 17, 2000.

26. *Special Report — DPRK Report # 26* (September-October, 2000), NAPSNet, November 29, 2000.

27. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, *North Korea Through the Looking Glass* (Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 2000), p. 178.

28. Reportedly, Nazdratenko's deputy and now his successor, Konstantin Tolstoshein, is as politically arrogant and corrupt as was Nazdratenko. *The New York Times,* February 12, 2001.
29. Michael Wines, "In Which We Learn How to Hide a Head of State," *The New York Times,* August 2, 2001.
30. Michael Wines, "North Korean, with Putin, Vows to Curb Missile Program," *Ibid,* August 5, 2001. Wines writes that Kim stayed in the same Kremlin guest house in which his father had stayed when the latter visited Russia in 1984.
31. Dave Montgomery, "North Korea's Kim Visits Russian Facilities," Knight Ridder News Service, Moscow, August 6, 2001.
32. Huang Song-joon, "Chairman Kim to Open Trade Office in St. Petersburg," *Joongang Ilbo,* August 13, 2001.
33. *The DPRK Report,* No. 25 (July-August, 2000), p. 2.