By William S. Lind
America’s fixation on the threat from North Korea’s missiles and nuclear weapons evinces the usual American dive into the weeds. If we instead stand back a bit and look at the strategic picture, we quickly see that the North Korean threat to China is far greater than its threat to us.
North Korea is unlikely to launch a nuclear attack on the United States. However, if North Korea retains its nuclear weapons, it is likely to lead South Korea, Japan, and possibly Taiwan, Australia and Vietnam to go nuclear themselves. From the Chinese perspective, that would be a strategic catastrophe.
China has never sought world domination, nor is it likely to do so. Its distaste for barbarians, who include everyone not Chinese, is such that it wants to maintain its distance from them. However, maintaining that distance requires a buffer zone around China, which historically China has sought and is seeking again now.
At present, the main obstacle to creating that buffer zone of semi-independent client states is the United States. That is a strategic blunder on our part. Such a buffer zone is no threat to the U.S. or to its vital interests.
However, China knows American power is waning and the American people are tired of meaningless wars on the other side of the world. Despite America, China’s influence on the states in her proximity is rising. She can afford to be patient.
In contrast, if the states on China’s periphery get nuclear weapons, her quest to dominate them is permanently blocked. An American presence is no longer required to balk her ambitions. Even weak states such as Vietnam can stop her cold if they have nukes. Her border states, instead of serving as a buffer, become dangerous threats sitting right on her frontiers. Even if she should defeat one of them, the damage she would suffer in a nuclear exchange would knock her out of the ranks of the great powers and might cause her to come apart internally, which is the Chinese leadership’s greatest fear because it has so often happened throughout her history.
President Trump will soon be visiting China. If he and those around him ask the all-important question, “What would Bismarck do?”, they should be able to motivate China to finally do what is necessary with North Korea, namely give it an offer it cannot refuse.
The script runs roughly like this. President Trump makes the case about the need to restrain North Korea’s nuclear program. Instead of threatening trade or other measures if China refuses, he simply says, “If North Korea retains its nukes and delivery systems, we can no longer advise our allies in Asia not to go nuclear. We will of course regret such nuclear proliferation, but we will also understand why they have to develop their own nuclear weapons. In some cases, we may find it necessary to assist them with delivery systems such as missile-equipped submarines. Of course, nuclear weapons in the hands of our allies are not a threat to the United States.” He need not add that they will be a threat to China.
Nation’s foreign policies are not motivated by other nation’s needs. Beijing does not care about the threat North Korean nukes pose to the U.S. But nations are motivated by their own interests, and if we put North Korea’s nukes in this context, the context of the strategic threat reactions to them pose to China, that is a different kettle of fish.
In turn, we need to remember Bismarck’s dictum that politics is the art of the possible. North Korea is unlikely to give up all its nuclear weapons. However, at the demand of Beijing, Pyongyang can probably be brought to limiting their number and the range of their delivery systems. Beijing could also offer to put an anti-missile system such as the Russians’ S-400 on North Korea’s border to shoot down any South Korean first strike. North Korea could still use its few nukes to deter an American first strike, even if they could not reach beyond South Korea.
Are the Pentagon, State Department, and White House capable of Bismarckian Realpolitik? President Trump’s own instincts lead him that way. Whether his administration can follow is open to doubt.