Not for the IDF Alone

Ever since the first day of the current Israeli-Palestinian war on 7 October 2023, Israel’s media have been bristling with stories about heroic Israeli (not Palestinian, needless to say) women. How they received their mobilization orders just as men did. How they took their leave of home and hearth (including, in some cases, their children) just as men did. How they donned uniform, took up their weapons, and went out to fight just as men did. How some of them were killed just as men were. Here I want to say, loud and clear: almost all of it is nonsense. Nonsense in tomato juice, as we Israelis like to say. Nonsense of the kind that, in the long run, will do the IDF incalculable harm.

First, the nonsense. As of the time I am writing this at the end of November 2023, Israel’s mobilized armed forces number about 550,000 uniformed personnel, up from 180,000 in “ordinary” times. Of the latter figure between 25 and 30 percent are women. How many women have been called up and are currently on active service the IDF does not say. However, its official casualty list (in Hebrew) is available here. It shows that, as of 21 November, 392 IDF soldiers had lost their lives. Of those 40, or one in eight, were female.

At first sight one in eight does not appear totally unreasonable, given that most of the troops on active service are reservists and that far fewer female reservists than male ones were called up. However, pay attention to the following. The male casualties on the list are distributed over a period of 35 days. Not so the female ones, all but one of whom lost their lives during the first day of the war. Poor girls; serving as outlooks, insufficiently trained in the use of the infantry weapons with which they had been issued, unsupported either on the ground or from the air, they were in no position either to escape or to fight off Hamas’ surprise attack. Expiring as Odysseus’ maids did (Odyssey XXII 468-73):

[Like birds], with nooses around their necks

that they might die most piteously.

And they writhed a little while with their feet

but not for long.

Shame on you, IDF, for allowing such things to happen. And shame on you, penis-envy driven feminist fiends, for misleading your credulous women followers and pushing them in that direction! The much lower number killed since then suggests that, whatever female soldiers may have been doing from 8 October on, they hardly took part in any serious fighting. Case closed.

Second, the long term harm. It is a truism, observable throughout history and in practically every human field, institution or organization, that wherever women make their entry men leave. So in the case of cashiers, so in that of pharmacists, and so in that of psychologists among many others. In part they do so by default: no two persons can occupy a chair designed for one. But there is more to it than that. To quote Frederick the Great, a commander who knew a thing or two about fighting spirit, the one thing that can make men march into the muzzles of the cannons trained at them is honor. Specifically, I add, male honor, the kind more or less reserved for men that makes them attractive for women. Conversely, for a man to do a woman’s work is not an honor. It is humiliation. Think of Heracles who, at one point in his career, was punished by being made to dress as a woman and acting as a handmaid to the mythical Queen Omphale. Omphale, incidentally, reads like the female form of “navel,” but I’ll let that pass.

A man who competes with (or fights against) a woman and loses, loses. A man who competes with (or fights against) a woman and wins also loses; killing a woman may be profitable, but it is rarely considered honorable. Finding themselves in a lose/lose situation, no wonder many men prefer to withdraw. Supposing only the process goes on long enough, the military will end up by being left with hardly any men worthy of the name at all.

Nor does this warning refer to the IDF alone.

Checkmate

Dvora and I have a grandson. Only child of Efrat and Jonathan, he is called Avishai, a Biblical name meaning “my father’s [or God’s] gift.” Like all grandchildren he is the cutest little boy in the world. With unruly blond curlers and mischievous eyes that are almost always laughing. He loves playgrounds, running about, and ice cream. And chocolate balls too! He is a chatterbox who even as he adds new words to his already quite extensive vocabulary sometimes finds his thoughts outrunning his ability to express them, causing a slight but touching stammer. In a few weeks he will be four years old.

For those of you who are not familiar with the geography of this country, the answer to your question—is his life in any great danger owing to the war—is no. The distance from Gaza to Rehovot where Avishai and his parents live is about 54 kilometers. Their flat is located on the 12th floor of a high rise building. Not only is there no way they can reach the ground floor on time, but there is no point in trying to do so; the building does not have an underground shelter. Instead the flat is provided with a reinforced room that will hopefully protect its inhabitants against anything but a close hit.

But that does not mean that, both in Rehovot and elsewhere, the ongoing hostilities do not make their impact felt. Our oldest grandson, Orr (“Light”) is a junior IDF officer. Though not of the kind where his life is in any greater danger than that of most people here. But three of his cousins, two boys and a girl, are rapidly approaching the age where they will have to reflect about what they are going to do when the call comes as, it surely will. Rehovot itself, located as it is near a major air base, has been attacked many times, luckily resulting in very limited casualties and damage. There and elsewhere other reminders of the war include the rather frequent roar of IsraeIi fighter bombers flying overhead; the somewhat muted atmosphere in what is normally quite a boisterous country; and the growing number of wounded men—hardly any women, fortunately—one comes across in the streets.

When the guns fire, the kids cry. On both sides of the front, mind you. That is why I am posting the following poem, originally written in Hebrew by the late Israeli poet, publicist and playwright Hanoch Levin. But dedicated, on this occasion, to the children of both Israel and Gaza.

 

Checkmate

O where has my boy gone

My good boy where has he gone?

A black pawn has killed a white one.

My daddy won’t return. My daddy won’t be back

A white pawn has killed a black one.

There’s weeping in the homes, there’s silence on the green

The king is playing with the queen.

My boy won’t rise again. He sleeps, he won’t grow

A black pawn has killed a white one.

My daddy is in darkness, no more will he see light

A white pawn has killed a black one.

There’s weeping in the homes, there’s silence on the green

The king is playing with the queen.

My boy once at my breast is now a cloud of snow

A black pawn has killed a white one.

My father’s kindly heart is now a frozen sack

A white pawn has killed a black one.

There’s weeping in the homes, there’s silence on the green

The king is playing with the queen.

O where has my boy gone

My good boy where has he gone?

All soldiers black all soldiers white fall low.

My daddy won’t return. My daddy won’t be back

A white pawn has killed a black one.

There are no white pawns left nor any black ones

There’s weeping in the homes, there’s silence on the green

The king is playing with the queen.

There’s weeping in the homes, there’s silence on the green

And still the king keeps playing with the queen.

 

You can find the song at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d70p5EpwKC0. I have listened to it many times, and each time it makes me want to tear out the few hairs I have left on my head. What have we humans done, what are we doing, to each other! Skip the accords and start at 1.47 minutes.

The above translation is based on the one at the website with some changes of my own.

Guest Article: Why Hamas Will Lose

By

Colonel (res.) Dr. Moshe Ben David*

Professor Yuval Harari, who teaches modern history at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, has turned himself into one of the leading intellectuals of the Western world. His books, particularly Homo Deus, deal with important turning points in human history as well as our ability to survive into the future. In no small part thanks in part to President Obama’s endorsement, they reached the stop of the best-sellers list. As requests for articles and interviews came pouring in, they also made the author famous. True, many of his best known prophecies have neither materialized nor look as if they are going to be materialized. Instead of making progress towards a better, more peaceful and better off, world what we see is Covid-17, starvation in the Sudan, and war both in Europe and the Middle East; not to mention terrorism over much of the world. None of this has caused Harari to lose confidence in himself and his ability to look into the future. In particular, in an article just published on Israel’s most important news website as well as a CNN-interview with Christiane Amanpour, he discussed the future of Israel’s war against Hamas. Israel, so Harari, has no chance of winning the war. Why? Because, to do so, the government in Jerusalem would have to lay down clear objectives, something which, so far, it has been unable to do. Israel, he went on to say, needs a new government. One that would drop its “preposterous Biblical fantasies” concerning a complete victory and prepare for some kind of compromise. He ends by saying that Israel and Hamas have reached an impasse. Even in case the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) succeed in defeating Hamas and disarming it, the real outcome will be a defeat for Israel. The only way to prevent such a situation is compromise, negotiation and peace.

I’d like to use, as my opening shot, the work of the widely respected American political scientist Bernard Brodie (1910-78). To be viable, so Brodie, a military-political plan must take into account objectives and means; including, among the latter, the balance of armed force and society’s willingness to sacrifice some of its young men in the process of attaining them. Seen in this light, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statement, on the first day of the war, that Israel’s objective is “the complete destruction of Hamas”—the organization which, on 7 October 2023, subjected Israel to a surprise attack and inflicted some 1,000 casualties in a single day—appears both reasonable and attainable. Reasonable, because it reminds one of the Allies’ highly successful “unconditional surrender” during World War II, a formula that proved highly successful. Attainable, because of the military balance in Gaza. Clearly, in case Israel fails to achieve Netanyahu’s stated objective it will have to change its policy. That is what the cabinet is for.

Here it is worth adding that there exists a fundamental difference between the attacker and the attacked. The former, in this case Hamas, can adopt any objectives he wants. The latter, in this case Israel, faces a simple choice: either fight or surrender. Supposing he decides to fight, his only objective can be to defeat the enemy. Everything else comes later and must necessarily depend on events on the battlefield—meaning that the relationship between objectives and means must remain flexible and cannot be nearly as rigid as Harari imagines. Indeed the whole idea of laying down the political objectives ahead of events on the battlefield, which is what he seems to say, is, to use a term I have used before in this article, preposterous.

Second, his claim that, to win the war or at any rate not to lose it, Israel must have a new government. One that will rid itself of all kind of all kinds of illusions concerning total victory and prepared for some kind of compromise. In this context it seems that Harari is unaware of the fact that, right from the beginning of the war, the IDF has been following the government’s guidance step by step. Not a single encounter with the IDF that did not end with Hamas being defeated, either by having its troops killed, wounded or captured or when those troops evacuated their positions, leaving its enemy in control or the battlefield. One does not change a winning horse in the midst of a race; doing so can only strengthen Hamas in its decision to fight on. Besides, what does Harari think a change of government could achieve? Suppose the Israel decides to change its objective as laid down by Netanyahu and aim at replacing Hamas’s rule in Gaza by one run by the (Palestinian Authority) in Ramallah; does anyone really believe that Hamas will tamely sit down and agree? Halil Shkaki, the Palestinian’s Authority’s number one expert on polls and polling, says that 73 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank support Hamas and are in favor of the atrocities it has committed. Furthermore, the Authority spends 1.3 billion shekel, or 7 percent of its annual budget, assisting the relatives of Palestinian casualties who died while fighting Israel. This on top of symbolic gestures such as naming streets and squares after them, praising them in the schoolbooks it makes children study, and the like. Ending the war with a compromise, such as Harari suggests, will only enable Hamas to take over the West Bank in addition to Gaza, putting Israel’s heartland within easy reach of some of the heavy weapons it already has.

Harari’s third claim, namely that Israel and Hamas have reached an impasses that can only end in an Israeli defeat, is also wrong. Soon after the successful massacre they committed on 7 October Hamas’ leaders announced they were expecting to follow up with additional measures of the same kind. Unfortunately for them but fortunately for Israel, so far it does not appear as if they are able to realize that threat. Here is another, and much more likely scenario: following its successes so far, and after a due period of rest and reconstruction, the IDF will enter the city of Raffia in the southern part of the Strip and do away with the residuals of Hamas’ organized units on land, in the air, at sea, and underground. The oft-heard comparisons with the IDF in Lebanon as well as the American adventures in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq are, in reality, irrelevant. Why? Because the Gaza Strip only comprises 1.42 square miles, equal to 0.00083 percent of Iraqi territory, 0.00055 percent of Afghan territory, 0.0011 percent of Vietnamese territory, and 0.034 percent of Lebanese territory. Once Raffia is dealt with, all Israel will need to defeat what remains of Hamas and completely dominate the country is three brigades.

Dominating the Strip on all sides will also isolate it from the external world and make it much harder to smuggle in the kind of arms, money, and logistic support terrorists and guerrillas require. In this context it is important to keep in mind the fact that Gaza’s population is not homogeneous. About one third, consisting of natives (as opposed to those who left Israel at one point or another), supports the PA and would like few things better than settling accounts with Hamas which has been maltreating them ever since the Israelis withdrew almost two decades ago.

To sum up, it stands to reason that, even after it completes its occupation of the Strip, the IDF will have to carry out sporadic anti-terrorist operations. In doing so it will be able to draw on half a century’s experience not only in the Strip but in the West Bank as well. Ending terrorism will not be easy and will take time. However, given the various types of specialist forces the IDF deploys as well the various innovative techniques it has devised, many of which are the envy of foreign farmed forces and are widely imitated, there is no reason why the struggle will not lead to a successful end. Finally a word about the “preposterous Biblical fantasies” that, says Harari, are dreamt up by all kinds of Israeli extremists, including not a few in the government itself.  Nietzsche in his Untimely Meditations says that those who condemn the past endanger both themselves and others. This is because we are all products of the past, complete with all its problems, passions, errors and even crimes. That again is why, for both individual and nations, to deny their past is tantamount to shooting oneself. This is true of Harari himself; but it is even more true of countless others the world over who think as he does.

Col. (res) Dr. Moshe Ben David, is a retired IDF infantry officer with much experience in counterinsurgency. He is also a former vice president of Amadox Inc.

Lest the Pattern be Repeated

To anyone who has been following the conflict in Gaza so far, the gap between the opposing forces is astonishing. So much so, indeed, that almost the only way to describe it is by using superlatives. On one hand we see what can only be described as a juggernaut. One armed with the most modern, most powerful weapons and weapon systems in the world today; including artillery barrels, armored personnel carriers, and tanks (the latest Israeli tank, known as Merkava IV, is literally the heaviest, best-protected, in the world today); and covered from the air by what is widely believed to be the best air force in the world today. All defended from above by the most advanced anti-missile systems in the world today; all preceded by huge bulldozers fully capable of reducing anything in front of them to rubble; and all linked by inconceivably complicated, if largely hidden, networks of computers and communications produced by one of the digitally most advanced societies in the world today.

Now look at the other side. Men (not women, incidentally), many of them dressed not in uniform but in ordinary civilian clothes. Some wear steel helmets, but most do not. Some drive vehicles such as the famed Toyota Highlanders, but most must go on foot; given the extent of Israel’s technological and numerical superiority, as well as its command of the air, catching a ride in Gaza is bad for one’s health and can easily become deadly. Small crews of missile-launchers apart, very few Hamasniks—that is what Israelis call them—possess heavy weapons of any kind. The weapons they do possess consist mainly of assault rifles, hand grenades, anti-tank rockets and missiles, mines, and booby traps.

Nor is it a question of technological superiority alone. On one hand there stands a regular, well organized and well trained army counting almost 600,000 mobilized men and women; on the other, a semi-clandestine organization numbering, as far as anyone can make out, a few tens of thousands fighters. On one hand a state which, though small in size, surrounds its enemy on three sides. On the other, a heavily populated piece of land just 41 kilometers long and nowhere more than 12 kilometers wide—a distance that, given a little determination and a little drive, can easily be covered in half an hour.

To repeat, the gap between the opposing forces, the result of years of work during which each side prepared as best he could, can only be called astonishing. Such being the case, how to explain the fact that, after more than a month of ferocious fighting, the side with all the advantages had still not managed to decisively defeat the other?

Follows a very short review of some of the factors involved:

Surprise. Surprise, by confusing the opponent and degrading his ability to react, has always played a prominent part in war. Never more so than in this case when even Israel’s vaunted air force taken unawares, needed hours and hours before it finally got its aircraft to the point where they started fighting back. Indeed it could be argued that, by sounding the alarm and alerting all sides to the dangers that the Israeli-Palestinian impasse poses to world peace, Hamas’ offensive had achieved its main objective almost as soon as it got under way.

War on several fronts. Throughout the month-long war, in- and out of Israel, both participants and observers have focused their attention almost exclusively on the Gaza Strip. That is understandable, but it does not change the fact that Israel was fighting on several fronts. Including its border with Lebanon, and including some Houthi missiles coming from as far as Yemen a thousand or so miles to the south. Other IDF forces had to be kept in readiness lest the Palestinians in the West Bank—to the extent that they were able—as well as Syria, Jordan, and Iran join in the battle. Now Israel, owing to its small size, has always been lacking in strategic depth; like Germany (West) during the Cold War, but to a much greater degree, it simply does not have territory it can afford to give up. Willy nilly a cardinal principle of war, namely the concentration of forces, had to be violated.

Urban warfare. The Gaza strip is home to an estimated 2,300,000 people—in truth, no one knows. It is one of the most heavily urbanized regions on earth, second only to places such as Hong Kong and Singapore. As the recent months-long battle for Bakhmut, in Ukraine, has shown once again, urban terrain presents the defender with many advantages. Including the ability to fight not in two dimensions but in three—witness the 300-mile long network of underground corridors Hamas has constructed. And including also the practically unlimited opportunity to find cover. Conversely, the maze of streets and alleys limits the attacker’s ability to maneuver as well as bring up supplies and reinforcements on one hand and evacuate his wounded on the other. Fought at extremely close range among every kind of obstacle, such warfare can also rob an attacker of at least some of any technological advantages he may possess.

The war’s asymmetric character. Here is a story told of American Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara early in the Vietnam War. Asked why the US Air Force did not knock out North Vietnam’s electricity network, he explained that the entire network in question was smaller than that of Alexandria, VA, a suburb of Washington, DC. As such it had been knocked out several times already, to no visible effect either on urban terrorism or on guerrilla operations in the countryside. Ere the current war got under way Gaza’s per capita GDP only amounted to just 7 percent of that of Israel.  Calculated in terms of per capita consumption of electricity, the difference is larger still. In other words, the reason why the Palestinians, like so many others before them since at least 1945, are able to hold out and even emerge victorious is because they have nothing to lose.

The need to minimize casualties. Taking 1948 as the starting point Israel’s Jewish population has grown tenfold, far more than that of any other developed country. Still it is a small and intimate society; as anyone who visits these days will soon notice, people are extremely reluctant to suffering casualties.

Finally, international pressure. Strangely enough, Israel is the world’s only country that is not permitted to win its wars. Time upon time—in 1948 (the war of independence), in 1956 (the Suez campaign), in 1967 (when the US prohibited it from crossing the Jordan River to the east) and in 1973 (when it had to ab abandon its hold on the encircled Egyptian Third Army as well as some of the land it had conquered) international pressure forced it to relinquish some of the fruits of its victories. With the exception of the 1973 War, which later led to peace with Egypt, in each case the outcome was to enable Israel’s enemies to rearm and steer their way to another war.

In seeking a way to finally put an end to the conflict, let the world take care lest the pattern be repeated.

He Knew What He Was Talking About

From the media:

“The European continent is in danger if Israel fails in its war against Iran and its proxies, including Hamas,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned Monday, as he attempted to place the Gaza war within the global context of the battle for Western civilization. “What we see is a broader battle between civilization and barbarism,” Netanyahu told a group of 80 foreign envoys as he continued his stiff diplomatic battle for international backing for the IDF’s military campaign in Gaza to oust Hamas. Netanyahu has been under international pressure to allow for some form of a humanitarian pause in the fighting to allow for increased aid to reach Gaza through the Egyptian crossing at Rafah.”

Whether or not he was aware of the fact, Netanyahu, in taking this line, has at least one predecessor who was much more illustrious than he. Guess who wrote the following lines, when, and against what background: 

“How dreadful are the curses which Mohammedanism lays on its votaries! Besides the fanatical frenzy, which is as dangerous in a man as hydrophobia in a dog, there is this fearful fatalistic apathy. The effects are apparent in many countries. Improvident habits, slovenly systems of agriculture, sluggish methods of commerce, and insecurity of property exist wherever the followers of the Prophet rule or live. A degraded sensualism deprives this life of its grace and refinement; the next of its dignity and sanctity. The fact that in Mohammedan law every woman must belong to some man as his absolute property – either as a child, a wife, or a concubine – must delay the final extinction of slavery until the faith of Islam has ceased to be a great power among men. Thousands become the brave and loyal soldiers of the faith: all know how to die but the influence of the religion paralyses the social development of those who follow it. No stronger retrograde force exists in the world. Far from being moribund, Mohammedanism is a militant and proselytizing faith. It has already spread throughout Central Africa, raising fearless warriors at every step; and were it not that Christianity is sheltered in the strong arms of science, the science against which it had vainly struggled, the civilization of modern Europe might fall, as fell the civilization of ancient Rome.”

As recent events seem to show, science may no longer be enough. To save the West, more may be required. At the time he wrote the above in 1899 the author, a British subaltern, was 25 years old. He also worked as a journalist in the hope of making a name for himself. Assisted by his socialite mother who was said to have used her charms to help him along, he hopped from one colonial campaign to the next, greatly enjoying himself all the while. Twice he fought against Islam. First in the border area between what is now Pakistan and Afghanistan, then in the Sudan where he witnessed the tribesmen’s fanatical courage in front of the newly introduced Maxim guns. Each time the outcome was a book as well as a series of lectures illustrated by magic lantern and delivered throughout Britain.

His name was Winston Churchill, and he knew what he was talking about.

This is WAR!

As anyone who has gone through it knows, war is the domain of confusion. Some people don’t see the enemy when and where he is there (this is what happened to us in Israel). Others “see” him when and where he is not. Everyone’s nerves are on edge, causing them to behave somewhat strangely and often making measured, coherent communication all but impossible. Rumors, censorship, disinformation and plain deception abound. Obstructed by censorship, clearing up the confusion so as to get a proper picture of what is happening can take weeks, months, years, or even decades. Indeed the more evidence emerges, the greater often the difficulty of shifting through it all and making sense of it all. 

Yet man is the explaining animal. His huge forebrain means that he cannot exist without some kind of scaffolding to explain what has happened, why it happened, and what is likely to happen next. Absent a real explanation, he will first invent an unreal one and then, by repeating it, convince himself that it is true. Still, at the risk that everything I say will quickly be disproved, I shall try to pose some questions I have been asked and my answers to them.

Hamas took Israeli military intelligence, supposedly the world’s best, totally by surprise. How could this have happened?

It is as Nietzsche says: A great victory makes the winner stupid and the loser, malicious.

Can you explain?

Yes. It seems to have been a question of mirror-imaging. The confrontation with Hamas has now lasted for about twenty years. The IDF being greatly superior to Hamas, every clash ended in some sort of victory for Israel (or so at least the government and general staff, mindful of public relations, said). As “victories” piled up on top of each other, Israel’s confidence that it could handle this kind of attack grew. Just days before the sky came down on 7 October military intelligence was telling “the political echelon” (as we say here) that Hamas was being “deterred” and wanted nothing other than quiet. Punctuated, perhaps, by a few pinpricks to show it still existed and had something to say.

Today is Wednesday, the 17th of October and the twelfth day of the war. What is the situation now?

As far as I can see, the worst for Israel is over. The country has been put on a war footing, complete with the evacuation of many settlements bordering on the Gaza Strip. The reserves, 300,000 of them, have been called up and are deploying for action. Above all, the element of surprise is gone.

Obviously the first task is to make sure that no more terrorists remain at large inside Israel, a slow and, in terms of the necessary manpower needed to search every stone, expensive process. In the meantime, no doubt Israel’s airpower will continue bombing the hell out of Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip. In fact I can hear the jets flying in the skies above.

How did the destruction of al-Ahli hospital in Gaza affect the course of the war?

We—meaning, man (and woman)—have a strong tendency to always pounce on the latest events as the most important ones of all. After the attack on the hospital took place Hamas was quick to blame Israel, making the latter’s enemies leap for joy and causing Israelis to fear for the international support their country so urgently needs. Once it turned out that it was a rocket fired by the Islamic Jihad which did the damage and killed people things returned more or less to “normal.” Meaning, both sides stick to their strategy. Hamas in sending rockets into Israel in the hope of killing and injuring as many people as possible. And the Israeli military, in trying to “get” as many terrorists as possible so as make them stop doing so.

President Biden visited Israel and stayed for about five hours. What has he achieved?

The original objective of the visit was to a. Demonstrate American support for Israel; b. Help enlist humanitarian assistance the residents of Gaza; c. Bring together Palestinian, Jordanian, and Egyptian leaders in the hope of finding some kind of solution to the crisis. The first and second of these objective may have been achieved, at least to some extent. As to the third, no progress at all.   

Will there be a full-scale Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip?

I hope not. The Strip is one of the most heavily populated and urbanized pieces of land in the world. If that were not enough, the population is among the youngest—fully half of it is under nineteen years old. In countless cases, a combination of unemployment and chronic shortages mean that these people have nothing to lose, increasing their hatred for Israel and turning them into easy targets for Hamas recruiters.

As the World War II sieges of Leningrad and Stalingrad e.g showed, urban terrain, provided it is properly defended, can present an attacker with formidable problems. The deeper into it he wades, the greater his problems. Such as getting in supplies and reinforcements, ambushes, evacuating the wounded, etc.

How about Hezbollah in Lebanon? Will it join the fray, or will it stay out?

Very difficult to say. Hezbollah is a secretive organization and notoriously hard to penetrate. So far its leaders have been almost rabid in their declarations of support for Hamas; over the last few daysת their attacks on Israel have been increasing. They seem to be testing the waters—a dangerous game that may escalate שא any moment.

Syria and Iran?

Following twelve years of more or less intensive civil war, Syria hardly has any armed forces worth mentioning. Those it does have are busy fighting their domestic enemies. The Iranians provided political and logistic support and may have helped Hamas in planning the attack. Currently they are making all kinds threatening noises. However, and perhaps because they worry about a possible American threat and/or nuclear escalation, they seem to have done little to turn them into reality.

The rest of the Arab world?

The war presents the Arab governments with a dilemma. On one hand, ere hostilities started more and more of them were either signing peace with Israel or inching towards doing so. On the other hand, many have been feeling the pressure of their peoples which are less inclined to peace than their governments are. Should hostilities in and around Gaza continue, one may certainly expect negative political repercussions including, in cases where this is relevant, the breaking off of diplomatic relations. But war? Only in case Israel aces imminent collapse.

The international “system”?

Many countries are involved. Including, besides Lebanon, Syria and Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Russia, China, and the EU. The United States has promised to stand by Israel. However, the record—Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan (twice)—makes this promise look somewhat dubious. Russia/China are in league with Iran, but fortunately there are limits to what they can do. And the EU? Being Dutch, I shall use a Dutch expression to describe them: klootzakken (scrotums).  Hopeless cowards who can only talk.

Do you think this may be the beginning of a third world war?

I consider that a remote possibility. But yes, it could be. 

Returning to Israel and Hamas, who is going to win?

Victory means breaking the enemy’s will so that he ceases to resist. At the moment I cannot see this happening on either side; either they are too eager trying to exploit success (Hamas) or too busy licking their wounds and restoring the balance (Israel). Such being the case, Voltaire’s saying about the imaginary battle between Avars and Bulgars will apply. Both will sing mass, each in his own camp.

What can this struggle teach us about the future of war?

In my best-known book, The Transformation of War (1991) I argued that the future of war was guerrilla and terrorism. This prediction seems to be coming true, isn’t it?

In a rapidly changing world, each time s war breaks out the media are flooded with accounts of the technological marvels it has spawned. That is understandable; taking a longer point of view, though, one could argue that the most important lesson is that war still remains war. Includes its nature as a violent encounter between two (or more) belligerents, each of whom is at least partly free to do as he pleases; the enormous challenges, physical and mental, it poses to those who direct it and fight it; its roots in interest on one hand and sheer hatred on the other; its tendency to call out the most brutal  qualities of man and make them spread; its tendency to escalate and, doing so, escape not just political control but any kind of rational calculation; the role played by stealth, deception and surprise; its dependence on the social makeup of the societies that wage it; and many other things which, together, do as much as in shaping it as any number of computers, missiles and drones.

Quo Vadis, Israel

In my last post I tried to explain the nature and purpose of the various parties represented in Israel’s parliament (the Knesset). Consquently, a friend of mine, the award-winning painter Bob Barancik (see on him https://www.creativeshare.com/bio.php) confronted me with some questions of his own. So here are my answers—for what they are worth.

Q: Did the recent raft of insubordinations among reserve air force pilots and IDF officers permanently damage the security of the state against Iran and other hostile Arab states?

A: Possibly so. War being what it is, the most important factor in waging it is not technology, however sophisticated. It is, rather, fighting spirit which in turn can only rest on mutual trust (as people used to say when Germany still had an army, today it’s you, tomorrow it’s me). The way some Israeli pilots, flight controllers, drone-operators ground officers and of course lawyers see it, that trust has been violated by their political superiors who, by seeking to drastically increase the power of the executive in particular, are weakening the judiciary and preparing a dictatorship. This, on top of demanding that the police and the military resort to draconian measures to break the resistance of the occupied Palestinian population—so draconian that, should they be implemented, they have an excellent chance of causing those who carry them out to be dragged in front of the International Court for War Crimes in The Hague.

The problem is like cancer. The longer it persists, the worse it will become and the harder it will be to repair the damage already done.

Q: Could there realistically be a putsch orchestrated by IDF generals and/or security services to forcibly remove Netanyahu, Smotrich, Ben-Gvir from office?

A: I very much doubt it. Do not forget that the IDF, unlike most modern armed forces, is mainly made up not of professionals but of conscripts and reservists. They will be split in the middle, just like the rest of Israeli society. The outcome will be total disintegration.

Q: Could the Camp David Accords simply be ignored by Egypt and a return to old hostilities?

A: Such a move almost certainly will not come all at once but take time and psychological preparation among the masses. Also, an extreme provocation such as an Israeli attempt to expel the Palestinian population of the West Bank. But yes, it could happen.

Q: Do the Arab countries and Iran need Israel to continue to exist as a domestic “punching bag” or is the hatred so great that there could be a genocide of Israeli Jews ala Mufti of Jerusalem?

A: You ask as if Arabs and Iranians were made of the same piece. But they are not. Among the Arabs, the masses, including the better educated, hate Israel more than the government does. In Iran the situation is the opposite.

Incidentally, did it ever occur to you that things may also work the other way around—i.e that, vice vice versa, it is some Israeli circles that are using the threat as a punching bag?

Q: Is it likely that Hezbollah aka Iran will unleash a sustained barrage of missiles that would cripple Israeli infrastructure? Or will Israel’s nuclear capacity continue to deter the mullahs in the short run?

A: Israel has never published any nuclear doctrine it may have. At the same time, the general belief is that its leaders will only resort to nukes in case the country faces complete defeat—as by having its army reduced to the point where it can no longer fight, its logistic infrastructure knocked out, and a considerable part of its territory and population overrun.

With the worst will in the world, Hezbollah does not have what it takes to achieve these aims; so it will depend on Iranian (and Syrian) support. A bombardment with Iranian and Syrian chemical weapons might indeed lead Israel first to threaten and then use its weapons of last resort.

Q: Do you see an exodus of the “best and the brightest” if Bibi and company continue to hang on to power?

A: This is already happening. Many—no one knows just how many—academics, physicians, and other kinds of highly qualified experts are leaving or looking for ways to leave. The shekel, which for several years used to be called the strongest currency one earth, is falling. Tens of thousands, including some members of my own family, are trying to obtain foreign citizenship in addition to their Israeli one. While there are no statistics, my guess would be that there are few Israeli families left that have not considered this possibility more or less seriously.

Q: We live in the postmodern world, where everything is possible and almost nothing is certain.

A: How true. But it does not make forecasting the future any easier. If anything, to the contrary.

Q: Do you believe as someone said, that “This too shall pass”?

A: I think the threat is the most serious one Israel has faced since 1973. Unless very, very great care is taken by Netanyahu, his government and his successors civil war, not just between Jew and Arab but among the Jews themselves, is inevitable. Such a war, especially one that leads to foreign (Arab and Iranian) involvement, might very well mean, finis, Israel.

Guess What That Is

As at least some of my readers surely know, Israel has long been all but unique in that, starting in 1948, it has conscripted women. Not all women, mind you, but only those who, simply by not declaring themselves to be religious, agreed be taken. Once they had been taken they were assigned to all kinds of auxiliary jobs like administration, logistics, and the like. Young and healthy, ere the feminist-mandated Love Police swung into action many had some fun with their male fellow conscripts as well as their commanders who, during Israel’s “heroic” period, were considered good catches. Their period of service—amounting, at one time, to 22 months instead of 36 for males—over, they got  out, married—those already married were exempt—had 2-3 children, and went on to live happily ever after. Happily, also in the sense that they did little if any reserve duty and were hardly ever killed or wounded in action.

Next came the 1979 peace agreement with Egypt, Israel’s largest and most powerful enemy. As the danger of large-scale warfare receded, the overall number of casualties went down. Partly for that reason, partly under the influence of the American model, a mighty wave of penis-envy swept over Israeli women. In- and outside the military they decided that, unless they filled every kind of male slot and did every kind of male job, ground combat included, they would never be as fully human as they claimed to be.

One of the most interesting examples, which first started making waves in 2017 and is still drawing attention, was a case of some IDF women made to serve as guards in one of the prisons where male Palestinian terrorists are being held. Not just women, but blooming lasses 19-20 years old. Inevitably there was some frater- sorora—nizing. Frater- sorora—nizing being prohibited, when caught the women blamed the prisoners who had allegedly harassed them by using coarse language, exposing their genitals, and the like. One or two even claimed to have been assaulted; making people wonder what kind of prison it is that, assuming the allegations are true, made such things possible.

Other female guards accused their superiors, claiming that they had been “pimped off” by the latter in the hope of gaining information for the prison authorities to use. Given that the prisoners were not just males but such as had been suffering from sexual deprivation for a long, long time, there is nothing surprising in any of this. Investigations were launched, commanders fired, prisoners moved to other facilities, and the like.

The latest idea? Straight from the mouth of the horse (former minister of defense and chief of staff General Ret. Beni Gantz). Replace all prison personnel, both male and female, by older professionals. As critics were quick to point out, though, doing so would mean three things. First, since professionals are much more expensive than conscripts, a considerable rise in cost. Second, an increase in the already large number of female conscripts the military does not know what to do with. Third, and to some most important, the loss of an opportunity for women to realize their full potential by imitating men.

And so the merry-go-round keeps turning. One just cannot satisfy those feminist ideologues. Not given what they want, or claim they want, they complain. Given what they want, or claim they want, they also complain. Why? Because, as Freud once said, what they really lack is one thing and one thing only.

Guess what that is.

Hardly a Clever Thing to Do

25 November, International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women (why against women? World-wide, far more men than women die a violent death) is coming along. Focusing on Israel, between 2019 and 2020 the number of women who called the hotline complaining about domestic violence is said to have risen 31.5 percent. Compared to a year earlier, the May 2020 number of battered (or, at any rate, claiming to have been battered) women asking to enroll in a shelter went up 27 percent. The number of femicides went up from 20 to 26, 13 of whom were killed by their spouses. That of attempted femicides went from 2 to 14—a seven hundred percent increase, no less. The numbers go on and on. I have neither the time nor the inclination to check each one of the world’s 200-odd countries. From the few cases that I did check, though, it would seem that the situation in them is hardly different.

Attempts to explain the phenomenon vary. One school of thought has it that corona is forcing more people to spend more of their time at home where they are in close, sometimes inescapable, contact with their apparently not so congenial spouses. People get on each other’s nerves, leading to violence. Another focuses on the economic hardship that corona has helped bring about in many cases. Businesses have closed, employees have been fired. Nothing like penury, or the fear of it, to make people quarrel.

Supported by two decades of research and countless publications I wrote about various aspects of the problem, and always assuming the data are genuine and not faked or doctored by all kinds of feminists, I have two other explanations to offer. One is that women who for any reason dislike their male spouses or acquaintances have learnt how to harness the system and make it work for their own benefit. Not just for legitimate causes, but to settle all kinds of accounts, obtain compensation, explain how they got pregnant, and simply draw attention to themselves. Confident that they will not be punished—regulations issued by Israel’s Ministry of Justice actually prohibit prosecutors from tackling women found to serve bear false charges—they do as they please. For launching a complaint that a woman beat them up, men can be, and have been, arrested. For daring to defend themselves in court, they have been execrated. As, by the way, their lawyers have also been.

Second, for decades now men have been humiliated and discriminated against. It all starts at kindergarten where toddlers, barely out of their diapers, are taught that girls are sacrosanct and should never be annoyed or touched in any way. Even in the face of provocation. It goes on at school where boys, subjected to “sex education” are taught that they are, all of them, potential rapists; it goes on throughout young (and by no means only young) peoples’ lives. So defective, so one sided is some of the “education” in question that, having undergone it, one sixteen-year old boy I know had never even heard the word syphilis mentioned.

Each grape looks like a blood cell and all of the tuberculosis germs a minimum cialis 20mg tablets click over here of six months. This therapy is given by a device that comfortingly perhaps look likes a computer mouse which passes on sound waves at a very low pressure. generic cialis prescriptions As more blood flows in, the level viagra samples no prescription of pressure enhances and the penile region gets stiffer. There are pills in the online market for erectile dysfunction but also cures different types of sexual sildenafil generic viagra dysfunction. When the time to be conscripted comes, Israeli men serve thirty-six months, Israeli women barely twenty-too. For a woman, to escape conscription altogether is also much easier. All she has to do is to declare she is religious; that done, the military are prohibited from following up and checking. In large part because of women’s physical weakness, the combat arms consist almost entirely of men. A handful of pilots apart, no IDF woman has even been sent to fight in enemy territory where, which heaven forbid, she might be taken prisoner and treat as captive women often have been. By contrast, a huge proportion of the cushy slots—primarily in intelligence and administration—are held by women. In proportion to their numbers, women also find it easier to earn a commission. Whereas men are often called up for reserve duty, in the case of women this hardly happens. In all the forty years I spent teaching at two different Israeli universities, not a single female student ever missed a single class for that reason.

At their wedding, Jewish men are required to sign a standard document known as Ketuba. It obliges them to provide their brides with “food, clothing, and [sexual] fulfilment;” a woman, by contrast, does not have to commit herself to anything. As long as the marriage lasts, public opinion always gives women the option of not working; whereas men who do not work and/or keep their families fed can expect to be treated with contempt. Men work longer hours, and in harder, dirtier, and more dangerous jobs than women do. Women retire at an earlier age than men.

When the time for divorce comes—in Israel as in other “advanced” countries, two thirds of all divorces are initiated by women—fathers of young children in particular are very likely to lose custody. Whether or not they do so, chances are they will be made to pay. As the existence of ads aimed specifically at such men shows, not seldom to the point where they are left practically penniless. And not seldom even though their spouses are much better off than they themselves are. As cases—and there are quite a few of them—when men, having killed their spouses, do not try to escape but either turn themselves in immediately or commit suicide show, some men are being driven to despair, even madness.

But nothing lasts forever. As I have told my readers several times, I am a Hegelian. By that I mean that I see social life—history—as unfolding, not in a straight line but in zig-zags: action, reaction, action, and so on. Could it be that the rise—supposing it is real and not just a figment of feminist propaganda—in femicide is at least partly a reaction to the way Israel, a Western society, has been (miss)treating men over the last few decades?  

Don’t get me wrong. I oppose femicide—and viricide, a term no one else seems to be using–as much as anyone else. I look forward to the day when social life improves to the point they, as well as the death penalty, are eliminated. Meanwhile, though, the world is what it is. As the trends seem to show, in their attacks on men women, with feminists at their head, have gone much too far. Considering that it is only men who can defend them against other men, hardly a clever thing to do.

Under Fire (2)

 

Note: This article was first posted in July 2014. Almost word for word.

 

My wife and I live on our own in a townhouse a few miles west of Jerusalem, within range of the rockets from Gaza. Several times over the last few days the alarm was sounded. We react by leaving the living room, which has glass doors facing the garden. Should a rocket explode nearby, then flying shards will cut us to ribbons. So we move into the stairwell which, made of reinforced concrete, offers good protection. We are lucky to have it, for my wife has had her knee operated on and could not run if her life depended on it. I suppose something similar would apply to hundreds of thousands of others both in Israel and in Gaza. We wait until the sirens stop wailing—a hateful sound—and we have heard a few booms. Then we check, on the news, whether the booms originated in rockets being intercepted by Iron Dome or in such as have not been intercepted hitting the earth. A few telephone calls to or from our children, and everything returns to normal until the next time.

And so it goes. One gets up each morning, sees that the surroundings look much as usual, heaves a sigh of relief, and prepares for the coming day. Yet for several days now, much of Israel has been under fire. That is especially true of the southern part of the country. Over there ranges are short and incoming rockets smaller, harder to intercept, and much more numerous. There are several dozen wounded—most of them hurt not by incoming rockets but while in a hurry to find shelter. As of the evening of Tuesday, 19 July [2014], following eight days of fighting, just one Israeli, a civilian, has been killed by Hamas fire.

Several factors explain the low number of casualties. First, the rockets coming from Gaza are enormously inaccurate. They hit targets, if they do, almost at random. Second, the Iron Dome anti-missile defense system works better than anyone had expected.  The system has the inestimable advantage in that it can calculate the places where the rockets will land. Consequently it only goes into action against those—approximately one in five or six—that are clearly about to hit an inhabited area. The outcome is vast savings; in some cases, realizing that the incoming rockets are not going to hit anybody or anything, the authorities do not even bother to sound the alarm. Third, civil defense seems to be working well; people obey instructions and are, in any case, getting used to this kind of thing. Fourth, as always in war, one needs luck.

In short, generic medicines should meet the same standards generico viagra on line of quality, safety and efficacy as the original, this is often not the case. What are the side-effects? Its Side effects are generally mild and manageable. viagra samples Available in tablets, kamagra is one among the main reproductive disorders affecting satisfactory marital life. viagra 100mg You can buy them online or also visiting best price levitra the stores. In turn, the small number of Arab casualties and the limited amount of damage inflicted has enabled the government of Israel to keep the lid on its own actions in the face of extremist demands. It suggests a degree of control and precision never before attained or maintained in any war in history. But while the Israelis have been extremely effective in avoiding collateral deaths, the impact of their strikes against Hamas’ short-range rockets in particular is limited.

Israel’s lucky run will not last forever.  Sooner or later, a Hamas rocket that for one reason or another has not been intercepted is bound to hit a real target in Israel and cause real damage. Imagine a school or kindergarten being hit, resulting in numerous deaths. In that case public pressure on the government and the Israel Defense Forces “to do something” will mount until it becomes intolerable.

What can the IDF do? Not much, it would seem. It can give up some restraints and kill more—far more—people in Gaza in the hope of terrorizing Hamas into surrender. However, such a solution, if that is the proper term, will not necessarily yield results while certainly drawing the ire of much of the world. It can send in ground troops to tackle the kind of targets, such as tunnels, that cannot be reached from the air. However, doing so will almost certainly lead to just the kind of friendly casualties that the IDF, by striking from the air, has sought to avoid.

Whether a ground operation can kill or capture sufficient Hamas members to break the backbone of the organization is also doubtful. Even supposing it can do so, the outcome may well be the kind of political vacuum in which other, perhaps more extreme, organizations such as the Islamic Jihad will flourish. Either way, how long will such an operation last? And how are the forces ever going to withdraw, given the likelihood that, by doing so, they will only be preparing for the next round?

And so the most likely outcome is a struggle of attrition. It may last for weeks, perhaps more. Humanitarian efforts to help the population of Gaza, however well meant, may just prolong the agony. In such a struggle the stakes would hardly be symmetrical. On one hand there are the inhabitants of Gaza. Increasingly they have their lives turned upside down by the constant alarms, strikes, and people who are wounded or killed. On the other are those of Israel who, though their lives have also been affected, have so far remained remarkably calm and resilient under fire. Though some areas are badly affected, the Israeli economy has also been holding up well.

Perhaps because the number of Gazans killed and wounded is fairly small, international reaction, which is always hostile to Israel, has been relatively muted. One reason for this appears to be that no outsiders have what it takes to push either side towards a ceasefire. In a struggle of attrition it is the last ounce of willpower on both sides that will decide the issue. So far, it does not seem that the willpower in question has been exhausted on either side.