When a dictatorship is in trouble, ten to one that it will seek a way out in the form of war. Judging by China’s increasingly bellicose behavior in respect to Taiwan over the last few weeks, its dictatorship—and, yes, a dictatorship it is—ten to one that it is in deep trouble indeed. Consider:

• After decades of sustained economic growth during which per capita GDP increased seventyfold, the point seems to have been reached where the formulae first put into place by Deng Xiaoping during the 1980s no longer work. In particular, as President Xi Jinpin himself is well aware, the gap between rich and poor has grown to the point where it threatens the stability of the regime—as it has done many times in the past. New methods are urgently needed. However, so far there is no sign that they are being discovered, let alone implemented.
• In many places all over China, unbridled industrialization over the last four decades has resulted in ecological disasters without parallels in Chinese, and perhaps human, history. Unbreathable air. Undrinkable water. Vast quantities of poisonous materials seeping into the ground and reducing or eliminating its fertility.
• China’s decades-long policy of one child per family has long led to a situation whereby fewer and fewer young people have to support more and more elderly ones, forming a major brake on productivity. So far, attempts to remedy the situation by relaxing some controls do not seem to be working.
• By the best available evidence Corona originated in China. Next, its spread was encouraged by the Government’s reluctance to allow neutral observers to investigate the disease and do what had to be done. Combined with Beijing’s bullying behavior towards its smaller neighbors, this has caused its international credibility to suffer.

These are but a few of the challenges with which the Chinese Communist—in fact it is anything but Communist—Party has to cope. Whether or not they will actually drive the country to war over Taiwan is anyone’s guess; however, it is possible to say a few words about what such a war may look like.

•  As so often in the past, the war will be preceded by a period of intensified wireless activity, mobilization, troop movements, news-blackouts, etc.  In theory these and many other preparatory measures should be easily detected by the intelligence services of Taiwan and its allies (primarily South Korea, Japan, and of course the USA). But whether they will be detected, let alone believed and acted upon, is another matter altogether. Think of the German offensive against the USSR, think of the Japanese one against Pearl Harbor. In both cases plenty of warnings were available right under the intelligence services’ noses; yet when they came they did so as complete surprises.
• As so often since 1939, any Chinese offensive is certain to start in the air with attacks on Taiwan’s headquarters, communication- and transportation centers, anti-aircraft defenses, airfields and missile bases. Taking into account numbers alone, the People’s Liberation Army should be able to win these early combat operations. But then numbers are not everything; Taiwan’s defenses are up to date and well trained. From what one reads it appears they are also prepared to fight.
• The next stage will be fought primarily at sea. Early on the initiative will be in the hands of the Chinese Navy as it tries to blockade Taiwan and soften it up in preparation of the coming invasion. Taiwan, however, has it own anti-submarine forces and is certain to use them in a determined attempt to resist the aggressor and keep its lines of communication open.
• Suppose which is by no means certain, that at this stage the PLA can prevail. In that case it will surely use its ships to mount a large scale invasion. That, however, does not mean its problems will be over and victory, automatic. As history shows, sea- to land operations are about the most difficult of all and require a high degree of expertise which the PLA, for lack of experience, does not have. The seas around Taiwan are choppy with strong tides and, during certain seasons, torrential rains; not for noting are they known as The Black Ditch. The coast itself is rockyand hard to navigate. Thus an invasion may fail before it even gets properly started—as twice happened to the Mongols when they tried to invade Japan in 1271 and 1284 and also, to use he most famous example of all, to the Spanish Armada in 1588.
• A coup de main intended to win a war with a single blow may succeed. Or else, as Putin’s initial invasion of Ukraine showed once again, it may fail. In case it succeeds, little else will remain to be said. In case it fails, a prolonged campaign to break Taiwan’s by no means negligible land forces and subdue the island will ensue. The outcome of such a campaign will depend very largely on the joker on the pack, meaning the US and in particular, its navy. To avoid being trapped in the Strait, the US 7^th fleet, which is based  in Japan, will be deployed not west of Taiwan, as  laymen might think, but to the east of it. From there it will send its aircraft in an attempt to stop the invaders either before they touch land or at a later point when it will be a question of keeping their supply lines open.

To sum up, the above difficulties notwithstanding a Chinese attempt to subdue  an isolated Taiwan would stand a reasonable, if by no means certain, expectation of success. However, launching it in the teeth of American military power, the greatest on earth, would be a very risky venture indeed. And this without even considering the ever-present threat of nuclear escalation, whether deliberate or accidental, which literally might bring about the end of he world.

Thinking the unthinkable, as 1960s-vintage strategists used to say.