Between Scylla and Charybdis

Almost a year after Putin launched his so-called special military operation against Ukraine, the war in that country has clearly turned into a struggle of attrition. Historically speaking, such struggles are by no means rare. Clausewitz, indeed, argued that any offensive that fails to break the enemy’s will and reach its objective within a reasonable time will end up as a war of attrition. In particular, two struggles are worth mentioning in this context. One was waged by Germany, Britain and France on the Western Front and lasted from late 1914 to the end of 1918. The other was waged by Iran and Iraq and lasted from September 1980 to August 1988.  With these and some other armed conflicts in mind, let us examine the courses Putin still has open to him.

First, he may simply allow the war to go on just as it has over the last few months. True, the ongoing hostilities as well as Western-imposed sanctions have not been without some, perhaps considerable, negative effect on the Russian economy. On the other hand, those in the West who hoped to use economic pressure to win the war relatively quickly and painlessly have been proved wrong. In part, this is due to Russia’s own enormous resources, especially energy, raw materials, and, as the Germans learnt in World War II, its sheer size; “don’t’ march on Moscow,” a maxim attributed to British Field-Marshal Bernhard Montgomery, is as relevant today as it was in the days of Sweden’s Karl XII and Napoleon. Putin may well hope that, simply by allowing the war to continue for as long as it may take, he will end by breaking Ukraine’s will and/or split up the coalition that is currently arrayed against him.

Second, he may mobilize additional forces, equip them with whatever weapons he still has in reserve or is able to produce, train them, and use them to launch more battlefield offensives. This is what both the Allies in World War I and the Iranians during their war against Iraq did.  In the first case it worked, though only after four years of ferocious struggle and only at a horrendous cost that left both France and Britain drained of manpower and treasure. In the second it did not work at all; masses of young Iranians, many of them wearing Korean-manufactured golden plastic keys to expedite them on their journey to paradise, proved no match for the firepower, provided by both East and West, the Iraqis were able to deploy.

Third, he may switch from trying to defeat his opponents’ armed forces in the field to attacking their rear. “To make a dessert and call it peace,” as the historian Tacitus, referring to Rome’s conquest of Britain, put it twenty centuries ago. At the moment this seems to be Putin’s preferred option. Compliments of Iran, his drones have been attacking Ukrainian cities and more may very well be on the way. On the other hand, whether such attracts can really be carried to the point where the Ukrainians’ will to fight begins to crack is doubtful. Starting in 1963 and ending in 1973, three times as many bombs (by weight) were dropped on Vietnam as on Germany and Japan combined during World War II. Yet when the smoke cleared it was the US which withdrew and North Vietnam and the Viet-Cong which triumphed.

Fourth, bring in Belarus. Right from the beginning of armed conflict, belligerents of all times and places have always done their best to gain allies. Right from the beginning of the present war, Putin’s most important objective in this respect has been to get Belarussian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to assist him as much as possible. As a look at the map will confirm, such intervention may open a third, northern front against Ukraine in addition to the two, one in the east and one in the south, that already exist. Putin’s recent meeting with Belarussian dictator Lukashenko may be a big step in that direction. On the other hand, it may be a case of Lukashenko doing his best to stay out of the war without provoking Putin too much. He has been playing a dangerous game—so far, as far as anyone can see, with considerable success.

In one form or another, all four of these strategies are as old as history and may be employed both separately and together. What comes next, though, takes us into a really different world. To the best of my knowledge, no one has ever defined “tactical” nuclear weapons as opposed to “strategic” ones. The former are said to be small and suitable for “battlefield” use, military bases and airfields presumably included. The latter are sufficiently powerful for use against cities and their civilian populations. In truth, the distinctions are almost meaningless. Depending on geography, terrain, the extent to which the enemy’s forces are concentrated or dispersed, and many other factors “battlefield use” may mean anything between no casualties and hundreds, perhaps thousands, of them. What one side sees as a limited strike intended mainly to shock and impress the other may perceive as a deadly one that threatens his very existence. Even if retaliation in any specific war may be avoided, a country that uses nuclear weapons can expect them to be used against it; if not sooner, then certainly later when necessity compels and opportunity presents itself.

Next, the use of strategic nuclear weapons. From conventional weapons to tactical nuclear ones it is a huge step; from tactical nuclear to strategic nuclear, a much smaller one. Though no longer as large as they used to be when the Cold War ended thirty years ago, nuclear arsenals in the hands of both the US and Russia (soon to be followed by China in this respect) are sufficiently powerful to easily destroy the world several times over. That is why Putin, as long as he stays sane amidst the pressures to which he is subjected, will almost certainly decide not to use either them or the smaller tactical ones that lead to them.

Finally, conclude peace. Almost from the beginning of the war, Putin has had the option of halting his offensive, withdrawing his forces, and making peace. Such a move, indeed anything resembling it, would certainly bring about his fall as well as that of his clique. With only a slightly smaller degree of certainty it would also cause his country to fall to pieces—with consequences for Eurasia that are beyond his author’s imagination. That is why, at the moment, it seems the least likely possibility of all.

Caught between Scylla and Charybdis, Putin is.

When the Drones Come Marching In

Contrary to the common wisdom, drones are not new. Perhaps the first to build and use them were the Austrians in 1849; besieging Venice, which had revolted against Habsburg rule, they launched two hundred balloons that carried 33 pounds of incendiaries each. How effective they were, and what role they played in the city’s ultimate surrender, is disputed to the present day. Drones, in the form of remotely-piloted gliders and aircraft, were also employed by the German Luftwaffe during the last years of World War II. They scored their greatest success on 9 September 1943 when a contraption affectionately known as Fritz-X hit the brand-new Italian battleship, Roma, in the waters between Sardinia and Corsica and sank it. Others were used against installations such as bridges, with mixed results.

During the next few decades drones only played a marginal role in warfare. That, however, began to change in 1982 when the Israelis employed them with considerable success during their invasion of Lebanon. Some were used for conducting reconnaissance in front of the advancing armored divisions; others, to confuse and attack Syria’s anti-aircraft defenses until there were literally none left. Since then drones have multiplied and developed. As those who build and sell them never tire of pointing out, range, endurance, speed, maneuverability, payload, accuracy, and so on have all improved beyond recognition.

However, the most important developments in the field are seldom mentioned. They are, first, the fact that drones tend to be much smaller, cheaper—some come at less than $ 200—and more expendable than manned aircraft. And second that, being smaller, cheaper, and more expendable, they are capable of being used, and sometimes even produced, not just by states and their armed forces but by many other groups and organizations as well. Especially since the advent of GPS, almost anyone can build a drone in his garage. And indeed quite some people have been doing just that.

To gain a full perspective on the matter, consider the following. Starting at least as far back as the Peloponnesian War, the largest and most bloody wars were always waged by great powers against one another. In 1949, the year in which the Soviet Union became the second power to own nuclear weapons, this kind of warfare became obsolete. As additional countries acquired nuclear weapons during the following decades, they too were prevented from fighting each other in earnest. In time, it was this development that led to what many political scientists call The Long Peace.
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But that is only one side of the coin. While nuclear weapons have been preventing great powers from seriously fighting each other, drones have been working in the opposite direction. As the American experience in fighting the Taliban, as well as the Israeli one in fighting organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah shows, when it comes to fighting guerrillas and terrorists drones are of limited use. Neither in Afghanistan, nor in Gaza, nor in Lebanon, did they enable their owners to break the other side’s fighting spirit and win the war. Perhaps, to the contrary: as recent events in the Gulf illustrate all too well, they made it possible for these and similar organizations to extend their reach, striking at targets dozens and perhaps even hundreds of miles away. The effect of drones, in other words, has been to help level the ground on which non-state and state belligerents fight each other. It is in this, above all, that their importance lies.

And the future? I am not saying that drones are invincible. With the possible exception of nuclear weapons, no weapon is. Drones can be brought down either by anti-aircraft defenses or by other drones. And they can also be fought by electronic methods, meaning that the command and control systems on which they depend can be interfered with. That, for example, is what the Iranians did back in 2011 when they captured an American Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel near the city of Kashmar.

But make no mistake. As far as anyone can see, nuclear weapons will continue to limit war among the most important powers. Meanwhile drones, becoming increasingly sophisticated, will help make it easier for non-state organizations to confront the powers in question, thus presenting the world with a new challenge that is not just military but political as well. And one that states and their militaries better take seriously before it is too late.