Tanks Here, Tanks There

Now that, following decades of non-use, tanks are once again making headlines in Europe, readers rightly demand a short explanation of their origins, development, and role in modern warfare.

Tanks, meaning mechanically-propelled, tracked, weaponized and armored, fighting vehicles, first made their appearance on the battlefield when the British and French armies deployed them in 1916. They went through their greatest days of glory in 1939-45 when the principal belligerents—Germany, the Soviet Union, Britain and the US—all produced them by the thousand (Japan also had them, but in nowhere like the same number or quality). Tanks took a prominent role both in the Arab-Israeli Wars (1948-1982) and in the two Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003-2011). At times, so great was their hold that popular opinion in particular tended to see them as the very symbol of warfare.

1916-1918. Almost from the beginning, tanks fell into two basic kinds: heavy ones, intended to lead the infantry as it tried to occupy and cross the enemy trenches, and light ones meant for follow up operations once those objectives had been achieved. The former moved slowly and were armed with cannon. The latter were faster and were often armed with no more than machine guns. The Germans also built tanks. However, so small were the numbers that came off the assembly lines that they hardly affected the conduct of the war.

1919-45. As World War I ended all the world’s main armed forces experimented with tanks. The outcome was a very large number of different models, including one with no fewer than five turrets and another that could move on rails as well as roads and open terrain. Nevertheless, by the mid-thirties the basic elements that make up a tank had been determined and become well-nigh universal. Including a single turret-mounted gun, a hull, and a suspension system; a configuration that, later on, came to be known as a main battle tank.

During the 1930s Germany pioneered armored divisions. Tanks apart, they were made up of artillery, anti-tank guns and infantry. All under a single headquarters, and all provided with the necessary supply, maintenance and repair services. Strongly supported from the air, they enjoyed their most spectacular successes in 1939-42 when they overran most of Europe and came within a hair of winning World War II both in Russia and in North Africa. Later, in 1943-45, they played an equally important role both on the Eastern and the Western Fronts. The tank’s development may be gauged from the fact that, by 1945, some Soviet ones mounted an awesome 122 mm. gun, a far cry from the 37 mm. that had been the norm even as late as in 1936-37. As guns grew so did the turrets that carried them, the hulls and suspensions that carried the turrets, the armor that protected them, and the engines that drove the lot.

1945-73. Tanks continued to increase in weight and power, finally stabilizing at about 60 tons. Increasingly during this period, it was the Israelis who took the lead in waging modern, mobile, tank-centered warfare. Not only did they fight and win two wars—1967 and 1973—but they started building their own tanks from scratch. Other tank-building countries, Germany with its Leopard II included, sought some kind of balance between firepower, protection and mobility. Not so Israel which, as befitted its limited manpower, put protection first. This approach proved itself during the 1982 Lebanon War when not one Israeli tankman was killed inside his tank.

1973-2022. The period saw any number of technical advances, starting with smoothbore cannon (instead of the traditional rifled one) and ending with the kind of anti-missile missiles designed to prevent enemy missiles from hitting the tank’s own armor. Both in 1991 and 2003, tanks spearheaded the Western invasions of Iraq, easily defeating the fleets of older, Soviet-built, tanks fielded by the latter country. However, even as the tracks churned away in the desert warfare was changing. As more countries either acquired nuclear weapons or the ability to build them relatively quickly, large-scale conventional war appeared to be on the retreat. From Vietnam to Afghanistan, its place was taken by asymmetric war, insurgency, guerrilla, terrorism, or whatever it may have been called. As these forms of conflict showed, in them the role tanks could play was limited, often almost nonexistent.

2022-23. When Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022 his generals used tanks to spearhead their forces. And rightly so because Ukraine, with its wide-open, flat terrain, presents invaders with ideal tank country. But that did not mean a return to World War II. As also happened to the Israelis in Gaza e.g, Russia’s tanks were not used in their “classic” role of taking on enemy tanks and opening the way to large-scale maneuvering deep behind the front. Instead they served as close artillery support, helping infantry to advance street by street, building by building, in urban terrain; more like Stalingrad than like the vast maneuvers that led up to it and, now carried out by the Russians, followed it.

The future. Do current events in Ukraine harbor the return of large-scale conventional warfare and, with it, of tanks? Some experts think so and are even now designing all sorts of futuristic fighting vehicles. All this is good and well, but it ignores the fact that the one reason why the current war can be waged at all is because Ukraine’s arsenal, like that of Iraq before it, is limited to conventional weapons. One can hear the hard men in the Kremlin say:

Tanks here, tanks there. We’ve got

The atom bomb, and they do not.

How Much is Enough?

How Much is Enough was the title of a 1971 volume published by the RAND (Research and Development) Corporation, an American think-tank with close ties to the United States Air Force which provided the funding. The authors, A. C. Enthoven and K. V. Smith, were both veterans of the Pentagon where they had worked for President Johnson’s Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. Both were experts on systems analysis. At that time it was a fairly new and exciting discipline that sought to subject as many problems as possible to mathematical analysis; including not just military problems but such as comprised health services, education, transportation and the like..

Some of the most important problems, taking up a considerable part of the book, concerned what people called the nuclear strategic balance between the US and the USSR. What, precisely were the objectives of building up America’s nuclear arsenal? How many nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles would be needed to deter the USSR from launching an attack? Supposing deterrence failed and nuclear war broke out, what did victory mean and how to ensure it went to America? Should there be one kind of missile/bomber aircraft or a mix of several different ones? If the latter, then how many of each kind? How to best use them, and against what targets? How many, if any, should be kept in reserve? What was the best way to render them invulnerable to a Soviet attack? And so on and so on.

Today in NATO’s capitals—Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, and to some extent less important ones too—somewhat similar questions are being asked. With this difference that, as far as the public record is concerned, the issue is not nuclear weapons but how many conventional ones, specifically tanks, to send to Ukraine’s aid. Where and how to employ them, and so forth. It goes without saying that the discussions are highly classified. Still it is possible to draw up a list of some of the most important questions that, in one combination or another, will have to be resolved before a decision is make.

  1. The nature of the mission. Is it to be defensive—just enabling Zelensky and his men to hold out until something gives—or offensive—liberating the Donbas and the Crimea? Suppose the latter is the case and these objectives are attained but the Russians still keep on fighting—as they did in 1812 and, in different ways, both in 1917-18 and 1941—what then? Note that, as a general rule, fighting on the defensive is easier and requires fewer forces than going on the offensive does.
  2. Losses. How many tanks are the various NATO countries prepared to lose, and in what time frame?
  3. Availability and production. Not only are at least some tanks going to be lost, but they are expensive beasts. A brand-new Leopard II costs about 15 million Euro. As a result, no country has an unlimited supply of the most modern tanks in particular. How many tanks can the NATO countries send into the field without putting their own security at too great a risk? How many can be sent now? How many in the future? How long will producing and fielding new ones take?
  4. Substitution. Suppose NATO country A sends some tanks to fight in Ukraine. Will the rest make up for the deficit?
  5. As the Russian invaders have discovered to their cost, and contrary to their image as kings of the battlefield, tanks are vulnerable. To other tanks. To certain kinds of anti-tank weapons. To drones, especially such as are used to attack them from above rather than from the front where tanks carry their thickest armor. Such being the case, tanks rarely operate on their own but are regularly escorted by other forces, primarily artillery, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft defenses, and engineers. How many of those can be sent now? How many in the future? How long will producing and fielding them take? How long will training Ukrainian troops in operating the tanks take?
  6. How many tanks can be supported and kept supplied? Bear in mind that tanks and their supporting forces require huge amounts of supplies. Depending on the terrain as well as the kind of operation, a modern battle tank such as the Leopard II will easily consume 3.4 L/km on road and 5.3 L/km off it. Plus ammunition, plus spare parts. Plus, in case they fight on the defense, various engineering materials. Plus all kinds of other supplies (food, water, medical supplies) which, though small in weight, are must arrive at the right place at the right time. To aggravate the problem, tanks rarely remain at the same place for long, forcing the logistic tails to follow them.
  7. What are the Russians likely to do in response? Open a new front by dragging Belarus into the war? Start at least some operations in NATO territory? Mobilize even more troops? Resort to tactical nuclear weapons?
  8. Finally, politics. Building a model of what a nuclear exchange might be like, Enthoven and Smith all but ignored politics. Indeed their tacit (but far from unreasonable) assumption was that, in that case, there would be no politics. However, the war in Ukraine is not a one-time spasm. If only for that reason, NATO planners cannot ignore them. How much political capital are the various countries, both leaders and populations, prepared to spend in assisting Ukraine? For how long?

In the long run it is this question that is likely to be the most important of all.