Tag Archives: war

Pussycats, Again

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Intended to spotlight some of the weaknesses of the modern Western militaries, this book was written in 2014-15. Judging by publicly available material, however, during the years that have passed since then many of the problems have become worse rather than better. Consider the following.

1. Subduing the Young

“Anxiety and depression [are] becoming more common among [American] children and adolescents, increasing 27 percent and 24 percent respectively from 2016 to 2019. By 2020, 5.6 million kids (9.2%) had been diagnosed with anxiety problems and 2.4 million (4.0%) had been diagnosed with depression. About 5 million kids also experienced behavior and conduct problems in 2020, a 21 percent increase from the previous year.”[i]

“39.2% of [British] 6 to 16 year olds had experienced deterioration in mental health since 2017.”[ii]

“Mehr-psychische-Erkrankungen-bei-Kindern-und-Jugendlichen,” in Deutschland.”[iii]

2. Defanging the Troops

“The U.S. and NATO exit from Afghanistan may seem simply an episodic defeat. In a broader context, however, the Afghan withdrawal adds to a series of U.S. failures, from Lebanon to the Arab Spring, Iraq, Somalia, Syria—all these adventures ended badly, and the situation left behind was worse. We find ourselves today with the same security problems we had 20 years ago.”[iv]

“In Berlin and other German cities, some Bundeswehr personnel say they prefer not to wear their uniform when traveling to and from work, in order to avoid aggressive stares and rude comments. And in Potsdam, a regional capital near Berlin [which, historically, has been closely associated with the Prussian military], local politicians have been debating whether it’s appropriate for city trams to carry recruitment advertisements for the Bundeswehr.”[v]

Last time my wife and I went to Gatow, the Luftwaffe museum near Potsdam, we were the only visitors. With Ukraine in flames, let’s hope that such attitudes at any rate are going away.

3. Feminizing the Forces

In Finland, we are told, “conscription was opened to women on a volunteer basis” [sic!!!].[vi]

“The [Norwegian] military women in our study reported physical illness and injuries equal to those of military men, but more military women used pain relieving and psychotropic drugs. More military women aged 20–29 and 30–39 years reported mental health issues than military men of the same age. In the age group 30–39 years, twice as many military women assessed their health as poor compared to military men. In the age group 40–60 years, more military women than men reported musculoskeletal pain.”[vii]

“Over 7,000 U.S. service members… have died in the post-9/11 wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere” (as of July 2021).[viii] Now Women form about 16 percent of the U.S military, but only a little under 3 percent of those killed in action. Yet there are proportionally more female officers than male ones.[ix] Clearly, when it comes to gaining a commission women, very few of whom engaged in combat, have an advantage over men, many more of whom do.[x]

Compared with their male colleagues, female soldiers have it easy; less exposure to enemy bullets, less strenuous training, less hazardous work, various measures intended to help them cope with pregnancy and childcare, etc. American military women, unlike many civilian ones, are regularly screened for both physical and mental health. Nevertheless, we are told, “women in [the American] military more than twice as likely to die by suicide as Civilians.”[xi]

4. Constructing PTSD

By one 2020 study, “83% of all US veterans as well as active duty service men and women have experienced PTSD since the 9/11 attack, as a result of their military service.”[xii] Nevertheless, to this day no one has been able to define just what PTDS is, what causes it, who is more (or less) susceptible to it (and why), how it should be treated (assuming, indeed, that it is a medical problem at all), and so on. Other problems associated with it are overuse, overlap with other psychological problems and, last not least, the very real danger that, turned into a political issue, it will lose any scientific meaning it may have; which, as this volume has argued, in Germany it did.

Statistics on the prevalence of PTSD among military personnel do not show that the problem is getting worse. On the other hand, it is not getting better either.

5. Delegitimizing War

Some people hold that killing is a worse sin than allowing oneself to be killed. However, that only applies to individuals. Those responsible for the lives of others cannot afford to adopt it; for them, in fact, doing so is a crime. Now that any illusions about the future disappearance of war (e.g. F. Fukuyama, “The End of History,” 1989) have themselves disappeared, that remains as true as ever.

Conclusion: Hannibal intra Portas

We live in a period when life without terrorism, some of it internal, some international, has spread to the point where it has become almost unimaginable. True, a look at the statistics will show that, globally speaking, the number of casualties due to terrorism has not increased over the last decade.[xiii] However, measures taken to prevent it a certainly have. Not a port, not an airport, not a power station, not a mine, not a large-scale installation anywhere that is not being protected against it. Sometimes successfully, but perhaps more often not.[xiv]

Finally –

In 2014-15 American troops were still holding out in Afghanistan and Iraq and French ones, in Mali. Now, having achieved absolutely nothing, they are all gone. Meanwhile major war has broken out in Europe—the very Europe which for decades on end, was widely regarded as so peaceful as to be almost completely war-proof.

Need I say more?

 

[i] Georgetown University Health Policy Institute, Research Update: Children’s Anxiety and Depression on the Rise,” 24.3.3022, at https://ccf.georgetown.edu/2022/03/24/research-update-childrens-anxiety-and-depression-on-the-rise/

[ii] The children’s Society, “Children’s Mental Health Statistics,” at https://www.childrenssociety.org.uk/what-we-do/our-work/well-being/mental-health-statistics.

[iii] www.aerzteblatt.de/nachrichten/124350/, 3.6.2021.

[iv] S. Pontecorvo, “How Western Errors Let the Taliban Win in Afghanistan,” 2.10.2022.https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/02/kabul-airlift-taliban-win-afghanistan/

[v] M. Karnitschnig, “Germany’s Soldiers’ of Misfortune,” Politico, 15.2.2019, at https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-biggest-enemy-threadbare-army-bundeswehr/

[vi] YLE News, 4.11.2021, at https://yle.fi/news/3-12169597.

[vii] BMC, “BMC Women’s Health,” 17.10.2019, at https://bmcwomenshealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12905-019-0820-4.

[viii] Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs, “Costs of War,” at https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/military/killed

[ix] See Council on Foreign Relations, Demographics of U.S Military,” 2020, at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/demographics-us-military.

[x] See, for the figures, “United States Military Casualties of War,” at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_military_casualties_of_war.

[xi] W. Huntsberry at https://voiceofsandiego.org/2022/07/25/women-in-military-more-than-twice-as-likely-to-die-by-suicide-as-civilians/

[xii] Cumberland Heights, PTSD, at https://www.cumberlandheights.org/blogs/ptsd-statistics-veterans/.

[xiii] See H. Ritchie and others, “Terrorism,” 2022, at https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#how-many-people-are-killed-by-terrorists-worldwide.

[xiv] P. Knoope, “20-Year Fight against Terrorism Proves a Costly Failure,” Clingendael Spectator, 6 September 2021, at https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/20-year-fight-against-terrorism-proves-costly-failure

 

Tanks Here, Tanks There

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Now that, following decades of non-use, tanks are once again making headlines in Europe, readers rightly demand a short explanation of their origins, development, and role in modern warfare.

Tanks, meaning mechanically-propelled, tracked, weaponized and armored, fighting vehicles, first made their appearance on the battlefield when the British and French armies deployed them in 1916. They went through their greatest days of glory in 1939-45 when the principal belligerents—Germany, the Soviet Union, Britain and the US—all produced them by the thousand (Japan also had them, but in nowhere like the same number or quality). Tanks took a prominent role both in the Arab-Israeli Wars (1948-1982) and in the two Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003-2011). At times, so great was their hold that popular opinion in particular tended to see them as the very symbol of warfare.

1916-1918. Almost from the beginning, tanks fell into two basic kinds: heavy ones, intended to lead the infantry as it tried to occupy and cross the enemy trenches, and light ones meant for follow up operations once those objectives had been achieved. The former moved slowly and were armed with cannon. The latter were faster and were often armed with no more than machine guns. The Germans also built tanks. However, so small were the numbers that came off the assembly lines that they hardly affected the conduct of the war.

1919-45. As World War I ended all the world’s main armed forces experimented with tanks. The outcome was a very large number of different models, including one with no fewer than five turrets and another that could move on rails as well as roads and open terrain. Nevertheless, by the mid-thirties the basic elements that make up a tank had been determined and become well-nigh universal. Including a single turret-mounted gun, a hull, and a suspension system; a configuration that, later on, came to be known as a main battle tank.

During the 1930s Germany pioneered armored divisions. Tanks apart, they were made up of artillery, anti-tank guns and infantry. All under a single headquarters, and all provided with the necessary supply, maintenance and repair services. Strongly supported from the air, they enjoyed their most spectacular successes in 1939-42 when they overran most of Europe and came within a hair of winning World War II both in Russia and in North Africa. Later, in 1943-45, they played an equally important role both on the Eastern and the Western Fronts. The tank’s development may be gauged from the fact that, by 1945, some Soviet ones mounted an awesome 122 mm. gun, a far cry from the 37 mm. that had been the norm even as late as in 1936-37. As guns grew so did the turrets that carried them, the hulls and suspensions that carried the turrets, the armor that protected them, and the engines that drove the lot.

1945-73. Tanks continued to increase in weight and power, finally stabilizing at about 60 tons. Increasingly during this period, it was the Israelis who took the lead in waging modern, mobile, tank-centered warfare. Not only did they fight and win two wars—1967 and 1973—but they started building their own tanks from scratch. Other tank-building countries, Germany with its Leopard II included, sought some kind of balance between firepower, protection and mobility. Not so Israel which, as befitted its limited manpower, put protection first. This approach proved itself during the 1982 Lebanon War when not one Israeli tankman was killed inside his tank.

1973-2022. The period saw any number of technical advances, starting with smoothbore cannon (instead of the traditional rifled one) and ending with the kind of anti-missile missiles designed to prevent enemy missiles from hitting the tank’s own armor. Both in 1991 and 2003, tanks spearheaded the Western invasions of Iraq, easily defeating the fleets of older, Soviet-built, tanks fielded by the latter country. However, even as the tracks churned away in the desert warfare was changing. As more countries either acquired nuclear weapons or the ability to build them relatively quickly, large-scale conventional war appeared to be on the retreat. From Vietnam to Afghanistan, its place was taken by asymmetric war, insurgency, guerrilla, terrorism, or whatever it may have been called. As these forms of conflict showed, in them the role tanks could play was limited, often almost nonexistent.

2022-23. When Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022 his generals used tanks to spearhead their forces. And rightly so because Ukraine, with its wide-open, flat terrain, presents invaders with ideal tank country. But that did not mean a return to World War II. As also happened to the Israelis in Gaza e.g, Russia’s tanks were not used in their “classic” role of taking on enemy tanks and opening the way to large-scale maneuvering deep behind the front. Instead they served as close artillery support, helping infantry to advance street by street, building by building, in urban terrain; more like Stalingrad than like the vast maneuvers that led up to it and, now carried out by the Russians, followed it.

The future. Do current events in Ukraine harbor the return of large-scale conventional warfare and, with it, of tanks? Some experts think so and are even now designing all sorts of futuristic fighting vehicles. All this is good and well, but it ignores the fact that the one reason why the current war can be waged at all is because Ukraine’s arsenal, like that of Iraq before it, is limited to conventional weapons. One can hear the hard men in the Kremlin say:

Tanks here, tanks there. We’ve got

The atom bomb, and they do not.

Guest Article: The Greatest Danger

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By

William S. Lind*

An article in the December 9, 2022 Wall Street Journal brought some rare good strategic news about the war in Ukraine.  It seems that a few of Ukraine’s allies understand that a complete Russian defeat could bring about the dissolution of the Russian state, and that this represents the worst possible outcome.

The Journal article, “Ukraine Minister Urges Bold Support from Western Allies,” reports that:

Ukraine’s foreign minister called on the country’s allies not to fear a possible breakup of the Russian state as a consequence of the war. . .

Though Kyiv’s Western allies are united over the goal of preventing a Ukrainian defeat, not all embrace the objective of a full-blown Ukrainian military victory. . . 

Some of these allies worry that such an outcome could destabilize the nuclear-armed Russian state, potentially leading to its fragmentation and wide-scale unrest, with unpredictable global consequences.

The Journal article does not identify the states that are expressing this concern, but hurrah for them.  They are daring to inject a note of realism into a policy world dominated by Washington’s neo-Wilsonianism, which has already led to the destruction of several states, including Iraq, Syria, and Libya.  These (undoubtedly European) governments expressing their concern about a potential Russian break-up seem to have grasped the central fact of the 21st century strategy, namely that a state collapse is a greater danger than state bad behavior.  Europe would be facing fewer problems today if Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya were all functioning states ruled by tyrants.

As I have written many times, state collapse is the greatest danger we face and it is spreading.  We may be witnessing it in Iran.  I too would be happy to see the fall of Iran’s Islamic theocracy and the return of the young Shah, who’s father it might be remembered, was overthrown because he tried to modernize his country. But if the result of the ayatollah’s demise is a collapse of the Iranian state, which is a fairly fragile state because much of the population is non-Persian, then we are better off with the theocrats.

China, too, is facing unprecedented disorder, largely because of misgovernment by Xi Jinping.  He botched the coronavirus problem (which probably started in a military lab in Wuhan that was tasked with developing biological weapons), collapsed the Chinese real estate market which is where most middle-class Chinese stashed their savings, and then rewarded himself with an unconstitutional third term.  A more effective assault of the legitimacy of Communist Party rule is difficult to imagine.  But as Washington delights in China’s problems, it forgets that China’s history is one of internal disunion, civil wars, and prolonged periods of warring states.  Mix that with nuclear weapons and, as with Russia, it should be clear that stabilizing the Chinese state is a primary strategic objective.  Of course, all the Wilsonians do is bleat more pathetically about “democracy” and “human rights.”

That is unrealism Washington may pay for heavily.  If Russia or China break up into stateless regions, the world economy will tank the way it did in the 1930s, or worse.  America will not escape a second Great Depression.  If Washington’s folly results in nuclear weapons hitting American cities, the Blob (the foreign policy establishment) will find itself out of work if not hanging from lampposts.  

America is deeply riven over irreconcilable cultural differences, to the point where all that holds it together is a seeming prosperity – seeming because it is built on ever-increasing levels of private and public debt.  When the inevitable debt/financial crisis hits, that alone may endanger the American union.  Add a weakening or vanishing of states around the globe and the 21st century could end up a repeat of the 14th century.  

Let us hope those European states worrying about the potential break-up of the Russian Federation don’t lose their nerve.

Addendum:  The recent “coup attempt” in Germany will go down in history as the “Clown Putsch.”  Not only did the idiots behind it think a couple dozen men could overthrow the German state, they imagined they could put Prince Henry of Reuss on the Imperial German Throne.  Every legitimist, monarchist and Reichsburger knows that the throne belongs to the head of the House of Hohenzollern and no one else.  When Germany again becomes a monarchy, it will be through constitutional means and it will reflect a broad consensus among the German people that they want a Kaiser.

*   This article has been posted on 22 December 2022 at TraditionalRight

Between Scylla and Charybdis

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Almost a year after Putin launched his so-called special military operation against Ukraine, the war in that country has clearly turned into a struggle of attrition. Historically speaking, such struggles are by no means rare. Clausewitz, indeed, argued that any offensive that fails to break the enemy’s will and reach its objective within a reasonable time will end up as a war of attrition. In particular, two struggles are worth mentioning in this context. One was waged by Germany, Britain and France on the Western Front and lasted from late 1914 to the end of 1918. The other was waged by Iran and Iraq and lasted from September 1980 to August 1988.  With these and some other armed conflicts in mind, let us examine the courses Putin still has open to him.

First, he may simply allow the war to go on just as it has over the last few months. True, the ongoing hostilities as well as Western-imposed sanctions have not been without some, perhaps considerable, negative effect on the Russian economy. On the other hand, those in the West who hoped to use economic pressure to win the war relatively quickly and painlessly have been proved wrong. In part, this is due to Russia’s own enormous resources, especially energy, raw materials, and, as the Germans learnt in World War II, its sheer size; “don’t’ march on Moscow,” a maxim attributed to British Field-Marshal Bernhard Montgomery, is as relevant today as it was in the days of Sweden’s Karl XII and Napoleon. Putin may well hope that, simply by allowing the war to continue for as long as it may take, he will end by breaking Ukraine’s will and/or split up the coalition that is currently arrayed against him.

Second, he may mobilize additional forces, equip them with whatever weapons he still has in reserve or is able to produce, train them, and use them to launch more battlefield offensives. This is what both the Allies in World War I and the Iranians during their war against Iraq did.  In the first case it worked, though only after four years of ferocious struggle and only at a horrendous cost that left both France and Britain drained of manpower and treasure. In the second it did not work at all; masses of young Iranians, many of them wearing Korean-manufactured golden plastic keys to expedite them on their journey to paradise, proved no match for the firepower, provided by both East and West, the Iraqis were able to deploy.

Third, he may switch from trying to defeat his opponents’ armed forces in the field to attacking their rear. “To make a dessert and call it peace,” as the historian Tacitus, referring to Rome’s conquest of Britain, put it twenty centuries ago. At the moment this seems to be Putin’s preferred option. Compliments of Iran, his drones have been attacking Ukrainian cities and more may very well be on the way. On the other hand, whether such attracts can really be carried to the point where the Ukrainians’ will to fight begins to crack is doubtful. Starting in 1963 and ending in 1973, three times as many bombs (by weight) were dropped on Vietnam as on Germany and Japan combined during World War II. Yet when the smoke cleared it was the US which withdrew and North Vietnam and the Viet-Cong which triumphed.

Fourth, bring in Belarus. Right from the beginning of armed conflict, belligerents of all times and places have always done their best to gain allies. Right from the beginning of the present war, Putin’s most important objective in this respect has been to get Belarussian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to assist him as much as possible. As a look at the map will confirm, such intervention may open a third, northern front against Ukraine in addition to the two, one in the east and one in the south, that already exist. Putin’s recent meeting with Belarussian dictator Lukashenko may be a big step in that direction. On the other hand, it may be a case of Lukashenko doing his best to stay out of the war without provoking Putin too much. He has been playing a dangerous game—so far, as far as anyone can see, with considerable success.

In one form or another, all four of these strategies are as old as history and may be employed both separately and together. What comes next, though, takes us into a really different world. To the best of my knowledge, no one has ever defined “tactical” nuclear weapons as opposed to “strategic” ones. The former are said to be small and suitable for “battlefield” use, military bases and airfields presumably included. The latter are sufficiently powerful for use against cities and their civilian populations. In truth, the distinctions are almost meaningless. Depending on geography, terrain, the extent to which the enemy’s forces are concentrated or dispersed, and many other factors “battlefield use” may mean anything between no casualties and hundreds, perhaps thousands, of them. What one side sees as a limited strike intended mainly to shock and impress the other may perceive as a deadly one that threatens his very existence. Even if retaliation in any specific war may be avoided, a country that uses nuclear weapons can expect them to be used against it; if not sooner, then certainly later when necessity compels and opportunity presents itself.

Next, the use of strategic nuclear weapons. From conventional weapons to tactical nuclear ones it is a huge step; from tactical nuclear to strategic nuclear, a much smaller one. Though no longer as large as they used to be when the Cold War ended thirty years ago, nuclear arsenals in the hands of both the US and Russia (soon to be followed by China in this respect) are sufficiently powerful to easily destroy the world several times over. That is why Putin, as long as he stays sane amidst the pressures to which he is subjected, will almost certainly decide not to use either them or the smaller tactical ones that lead to them.

Finally, conclude peace. Almost from the beginning of the war, Putin has had the option of halting his offensive, withdrawing his forces, and making peace. Such a move, indeed anything resembling it, would certainly bring about his fall as well as that of his clique. With only a slightly smaller degree of certainty it would also cause his country to fall to pieces—with consequences for Eurasia that are beyond his author’s imagination. That is why, at the moment, it seems the least likely possibility of all.

Caught between Scylla and Charybdis, Putin is.

Next to the Bear

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The other day a Ukrainian TV station contacted me and asked me whether we could do an interview about what spending one’s life in the shadow of a large and aggressive neighbor is like. As, for example, the citizens of the German Federal German Republic (until 1989), South Korea, Taiwan, and of course my very own Israel all have done. As so often happens, I found the question intriguing. So having spent some time mulling over it—I do not claim to have done much research—I jotted down some answers.

Ere we start, though, it is important to note that much will depend on who you are. Including: age, gender, marital status, education, profession, whether or not you have children to look after, how close to (or far from) the security apparatus you are, any advance training you may have received, etc. Visiting the FGR for the first time back in 1976, I was impressed by the fact that every single bridge and tunnel was marked with data, complete with pictures of tanks, about the weight and dimensions of the vehicles that could pass through. On another, more recent, visit I witnessed some firemen and their families having their picnic suddenly interrupted as sirens called on them to present themselves for duty. It was merely an exercise and everyone was sure of it. Still I was impressed by the calm, orderly way in which the men went about their business (the women, burdened as they were with children, stayed behind).

That said, based on my experience in three out of the four abovementioned countries as well as some of the literature, here are some of the ways people react to such a situation.

First, the ostrich syndrome. People ignore the problem as much as they can; and rightly so, or else they could not exist.  This, my hosts during a short visit to Seoul (which is only some 50 kilometers south of the border with North Korea) is how the inhabitants of that city react. Having got used to it for seven decades, they simply refuse to take the announcements of their own security apparatus seriously but continue with their lives as usual. It has worked countless times in the past; so why not this one? Seoul at 1500 o’clock when young female office workers start flooding the streets—what a treat for the eyes!

Second, they share their worries with others in the hope of gaining relief. This is the Israeli method par excellence. For many years one of the most important words in the language was hamatsav (the situation). Humor, including black humor, helps. For example, German women during the last months of World War II used to tell each other that a Russian lying on one’s belly was better than an American flying high over one’s head. There were plenty of similar jokes floating about; by one story Hitler himself guffawed at them.

Third, they do, or at any rate pretend to do, something about it. As by laying down plans; cleaning up their air-raid shelters (those of them who have them); acquiring all kinds of emergency supplies such as water, canned food, batteries, first aid equipment, tools, and perhaps weapons; joining a civil defense organization; participating in all kinds of exercises; moving to a district or settlement less likely to be affected; and so on. In fact almost any kind of activity, by releasing dopamine or serotonin or devil knows what, can relieve the mind, redirect it and refresh it.

Fourth, they pray. That even goes for self-proclaimed atheists. I do not know how many times, I’ve heard Israelis say: I’ve just got a new baby. Pray that, eighteen years from now, he (much less often, she) will not have to join the military. Having three children and eight grandchildren, I should know.

Finally –

People, societies and circumstances vary enormously. However much thought governments, armed forces, social services and ordinary people invest in the matter, and however thorough the preparations they make, surprises are inevitable. Very often there is no knowing how the situation will unfold and how people will react when confronted with der Ernstfall, the real thing, as the Germans say. One moment the country is at peace. The next one the sirens come to life, bombs and missiles hit (or miss!) their targets, one finds oneself fighting for survival, and the chief of staff, having undergone a mental breakdown, resigns (this actually happened to the Norwegians when the Germans invaded them in 1940). Heroes become cowards and cowards, heroes. This may be carried to the point where heaven and earth literally change places.

War in Ukraine, Again

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Reader, Please note: This interview was originally done in German for a paper called, Junge Freiheit (Young Freedom). But much of what it has to say also applies to NATO as a whole.

*

JF: What do you think about Russia’s supply system? Some Western media have been claiming that inside the Kremlin, there are hot debates concerning the desirability and necessity of general mobilization.

MvC: You must realize that practically everything you, I, and most Westerners—who know no Russian and have no access to the original sources in the original language–learn about the conflict must pass through a series of lenses first. They are, 1. Ukraine’s own intelligence services and propaganda apparatus; 2. The West’s intelligence services; and 3. The West’s news agencies. Personally I would not consider any of these as particularly reliable; in any war, the first casualty is always the truth.

JF: Seen from a German point of view, how important is this war?

MvC: Should Russia win this war and be left in possession of Ukraine, Putin and his eventual successors will pose a vital danger to the West. As, to use an analogy, Hitler did after his defeat of Poland in 1939. That is why I am all in favor of Germany delivering weapons to Ukraine. However, there are several conditions that must be met first. Number one, Germany’s own defenses must not be significantly weakened; no point in holding the extremities if the center folds.  Number two, to maximize cost-effectiveness and prevent duplication the deliveries should be coordinated with the rest of NATO. Third, it is a question, not just of delivering weapons but of sending those that Ukraine needs most.

JF: Considering what we are told about the war, which systems would be most useful for Kiev?

MvC: Basically they are of three kinds. First, anti-aircraft defenses. Second, those that will enable the Ukrainians to identify and locate Russian targets, especially supply convoys, depots, etc., way behind the front. Third, those that will enable those targets to be hit and destroyed from a distance.

JF: The Americans and the Brits are sending many weapons to Ukraine. What has been the impact of those weapons so far?

MvC: Clearly they are very important indeed. Had it not been for them, the only strategy left to the Ukrainians would have been to allow the Russians to overrun their county as they themselves resorted to guerrilla and terrorism. Presumably the outcome would have been Russian reprisals and even greater death and destruction than is actually the case.

JF: People often speak of the drones Turkey has been providing Ukraine with. How important are they, really? Are we talking about an effective system, or is it just a question of reinforcing Ukrainian morale by delivering a blow here, a blow there?

MvC: It seems to be a very good system with many advanced capabilities. That is why, according to the media, the chief of Ukraine’s air force Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk, has called it “life-giving”. The popularity of the drone in Ukraine led to a song, “Bayraktar” being written about the drone while throwing insults at the Russian army and the invasion. Yet none of this means that it is some kind of silver bullet that will quickly win the war—several have been shot down.

JF: Recently we have seen the Ukrainians using very simple technologies such as pickup-mounted rockets. Operated by crews of four or five, they seem to be causing the Russians lots of trouble. Obviously war is assuming new faces. What else can we expect?

MvC: Almost any war, provided only it lasts long enough, will lead to one of two outcomes (or both). On one hand, it will accelerate the development and deployment of new weapons and weapon systems. On the other, it will cause old systems to be dragged out of the magazines, refurbished, and re-employed. Think of 1940. As the very time when the British, to combat the German submarines, were developing the world’s first shortwave radar they also leased fifty World War I-vintage destroyers from the U.S.

JF: It seems that the most recent Russian weapons, such as hypersonic cruise missiles and the T-14 tank are not going on active operations. Why is that?

MvC: The hyper fast weapon has been tested several times and seems to work.  Possibly the reason why it has not been used more often is because its range, about 2,000 kilometers, is way beyond that is needed in this particular conflict.

The T-14 appears to have experienced some technical problems which delayed its deployment. Serial production only began around the time the war broke out.

JF: Do you think Kiev will able to go on the offensive again? As by reconquering occupied territory and holding it against the Russians?

MvC: War is a dynamic business. Even during the years of stalemate in 1915-18 both sides on the Western Front—not to mention the Eastern one–were occasionally able to make limited gains. But will the Ukrainians retake all or most of the land they have lost? I doubt it.

JF: During our last interview, held early in the war, you warned against underestimating the Russians. Are you still of this opinion? In your view, how far is the Kremlin prepared to go?

MvC: In any war, underestimating the enemy is the greatest error of all. History is full of the cadavers of those who did so.

JF: Will they go all the way to the Crimea??

MvC: What do you mean? The Russians already occupy both the peninsula itself and the corridor leading to it. Albeit that their control of the latter is somewhat shaky.

On Escalation

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To most people, whether or not a ruler or country “uses” nuclear weapons is a simple choice between either dropping them on the enemy or not doing so. For “experts,” though, things are much more complicated (after all making them so, or making them appear to be so, is the way they earn their daily bread). So today I am going to assume the mantle of an expert and explain some of the things “using” such a weapons might mean.

  1. Making verbal threats. Almost eight decades have passed since the first nuclear weapon was dropped on Hiroshima (without any kind of warning, nota bene). Since then there have been plenty of occasions when countries, statesmen and politicians threatened to use the nukes at their disposal: Eisenhower in 1953 in connection with the Koran War, Khrushchev in 1956 in connection with the Suez Crisis, Kennedy in 1962 in connection with the Cuban Missile Crisis, Nixon in 1973 in connection with the Arab-Israeli War of that year, India and Pakistan in 1998 in connection with the Kargil War, and so on right down to Putin today. Some of the threats have been overt and rather brutal, others more or less veiled. Some were delivered directly, others with the help of a third party.
  2. To put some muscle behind the threat, weapons may be moved out of storage and put on display. Normally everything pertaining to nukes is kept highly secret. Here and there, though, countries have allowed their nuclear warheads, or replicas of them, to be shown, photographed, and celebrated for what they might do to opponents. In particular Russia, China and North Korea like to parade their intercontinental ballistic missiles. True monsters they are, any one of which can demolish almost any city on earth within, say, less than an hour of the order being given. Some such displays are accompanied by verbal threats, others not. At times the sequence is reversed in the sense that display precedes threats rather than the other way around.
  3. Raising the state of alarm. Again contrary to what most people think, putting nuclear weapons to use, in other words commanding and controlling them, is by no means simply a matter of pushing the proverbial button. First, those in charge of the weapons must make sure they are always ready to be launched at a moment’s notice. Second, they must make sure the weapons are not launched by accident, or by unauthorized personnel, or by an authorized person either deliberately disobeying orders or going out of his or her mind. The two requirements, speed (lest the weapons are targeted and destroyed before they can be launched) and reliability contradict each other; making the problem of nuclear command and control as difficult as any we humans have to face. Raising the state of alarm will cut through some parts of the problem—though just how, and to what extent, is rightly kept one of the most guarded secrets of all.
  4. Going a step further, weapons and delivery vehicles may be tested. Pace any number of computer models and exercises, ultimately the only way to make sure one’s nuclear weapons will work is to test them. Such tests, of course, may also be used in an attempt to influence the enemy’s behavior—as was notoriously the case when India and Pakistan both tested a number of weapons back in 1998. Some tests may be conducted in or over some outlying part of one’s own country as American, Soviet, British, French, Chinese, Indian, Pakistani and North Korea ones all were. Others may take place over some part of the vast no-man’s world that constitutes the earth’s oceans; for example, the Israeli-South African bomb said to have been detonated over the Indian Ocean back in 1979. It is also possible to send some of one’s missiles hurtling over enemy country, as North Korea has often done in respect to Japan.

Each of the above mentioned methods represents a different way of (hopefully) “using” one’s nuclear weapons in order to influence the enemy’s behavior without bringing about Armageddon. Historically all have been implemented quite often, some even as a matter of routine. The problem is that, since no country or leader has ever admitted giving way to a nuclear threat, it is hard to say how effective such threats were.

There are, however, additional ways states might put their nuclear weapons to use.

  1. Launching a limited nuclear strike at some less important enemy target such as outlying, more or less unpopulated, spaces or else a ship at sea. All in the hope of scaring the opponents to the point where he’ll give way to one’s demand, but without risking a nuclear response.
  2. Launching a limited nuclear strike at the enemy’s nuclear or, in case he does not have them, conventional forces. Targets might consist of early warning installations, anti-aircraft and missile defenses, troop-concentrations, communication centers, depots, etc.
  3. Launching a limited nuclear strike at the enemy’s industrial infrastructure.
  4. Launching a nuclear strike at all of the targets mentioned in bullets 5 to 7.
  5. Launching a full scale nuclear strike at the enemy’s main demographic centers.

One well known nuclear strategist, Herman Kahn, in his 1962 book distinguished among no fewer than forty different stages on the “escalation ladder.” In practice, there are two reasons why the ladder is largely theoretical. First, the various stages are likely to be hard to keep apart. Second, even if the side using the weapons does keep them apart in his own mind, the other is highly unlikely to share his views. In particular, a strike that one side sees as relatively harmless may very well be perceived by the other as a mortal blow or something close to it, thus bringing about the very retaliation he seeks to avoid.

As far as publicly available sources allow the rest of us to judge, up to the present Putin has limited himself to the first of these nine stages. That is less–considerably less–than some others have done before him. Still day by day his chances of winning” this war seem to dwindle. So the question is, will he stop there?

Thinking the Unthinkable

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When a dictatorship is in trouble, ten to one that it will seek a way out in the form of war. Judging by China’s increasingly bellicose behavior in respect to Taiwan over the last few weeks, its dictatorship—and, yes, a dictatorship it is—ten to one that it is in deep trouble indeed. Consider:

  • After decades of sustained economic growth during which per capita GDP increased seventyfold, the point seems to have been reached where the formulae first put into place by Deng Xiaoping during the 1980s no longer work. In particular, as President Xi Jinpin himself is well aware, the gap between rich and poor has grown to the point where it threatens the stability of the regime—as it has done many times in the past. New methods are urgently needed. However, so far there is no sign that they are being discovered, let alone implemented.
  • In many places all over China, unbridled industrialization over the last four decades has resulted in ecological disasters without parallels in Chinese, and perhaps human, history. Unbreathable air. Undrinkable water. Vast quantities of poisonous materials seeping into the ground and reducing or eliminating its fertility.
  • China’s decades-long policy of one child per family has long led to a situation whereby fewer and fewer young people have to support more and more elderly ones, forming a major brake on productivity. So far, attempts to remedy the situation by relaxing some controls do not seem to be working.
  • By the best available evidence Corona originated in China. Next, its spread was encouraged by the Government’s reluctance to allow neutral observers to investigate the disease and do what had to be done. Combined with Beijing’s bullying behavior towards its smaller neighbors, this has caused its international credibility to suffer.

These are but a few of the challenges with which the Chinese Communist—in fact it is anything but Communist—Party has to cope. Whether or not they will actually drive the country to war over Taiwan is anyone’s guess; however, it is possible to say a few words about what such a war may look like.

  •  As so often in the past, the war will be preceded by a period of intensified wireless activity, mobilization, troop movements, news-blackouts, etc.  In theory these and many other preparatory measures should be easily detected by the intelligence services of Taiwan and its allies (primarily South Korea, Japan, and of course the USA). But whether they will be detected, let alone believed and acted upon, is another matter altogether. Think of the German offensive against the USSR, think of the Japanese one against Pearl Harbor. In both cases plenty of warnings were available right under the intelligence services’ noses; yet when they came they did so as complete surprises.
  • As so often since 1939, any Chinese offensive is certain to start in the air with attacks on Taiwan’s headquarters, communication- and transportation centers, anti-aircraft defenses, airfields and missile bases. Taking into account numbers alone, the People’s Liberation Army should be able to win these early combat operations. But then numbers are not everything; Taiwan’s defenses are up to date and well trained. From what one reads it appears they are also prepared to fight.
  • The next stage will be fought primarily at sea. Early on the initiative will be in the hands of the Chinese Navy as it tries to blockade Taiwan and soften it up in preparation of the coming invasion. Taiwan, however, has it own anti-submarine forces and is certain to use them in a determined attempt to resist the aggressor and keep its lines of communication open.
  • Suppose which is by no means certain, that at this stage the PLA can prevail. In that case it will surely use its ships to mount a large scale invasion. That, however, does not mean its problems will be over and victory, automatic. As history shows, sea- to land operations are about the most difficult of all and require a high degree of expertise which the PLA, for lack of experience, does not have. The seas around Taiwan are choppy with strong tides and, during certain seasons, torrential rains; not for noting are they known as The Black Ditch. The coast itself is rockyand hard to navigate. Thus an invasion may fail before it even gets properly started—as twice happened to the Mongols when they tried to invade Japan in 1271 and 1284 and also, to use he most famous example of all, to the Spanish Armada in 1588.
  • A coup de main intended to win a war with a single blow may succeed. Or else, as Putin’s initial invasion of Ukraine showed once again, it may fail. In case it succeeds, little else will remain to be said. In case it fails, a prolonged campaign to break Taiwan’s by no means negligible land forces and subdue the island will ensue. The outcome of such a campaign will depend very largely on the joker on the pack, meaning the US and in particular, its navy. To avoid being trapped in the Strait, the US 7th fleet, which is based  in Japan, will be deployed not west of Taiwan, as  laymen might think, but to the east of it. From there it will send its aircraft in an attempt to stop the invaders either before they touch land or at a later point when it will be a question of keeping their supply lines open.

To sum up, the above difficulties notwithstanding a Chinese attempt to subdue  an isolated Taiwan would stand a reasonable, if by no means certain, expectation of success. However, launching it in the teeth of American military power, the greatest on earth, would be a very risky venture indeed. And this without even considering the ever-present threat of nuclear escalation, whether deliberate or accidental, which literally might bring about the end of he world.

Thinking the unthinkable, as 1960s-vintage strategists used to say.

Confessions of a Marine Corps Sensitivity Trainer

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This week someone sent me the following document, originally published at the end of 200I. Considered it too good miss, so I posted it as is without asking for permission. If anyone objects, I will be sorry. But of course I will take the stolen goods offline immediately:

By

Philip Gold

1973 was not a good year to be a Marine. Nam was over. Rebuilding hadn’t begun. And an awful lot of us, myself included, just wanted out. I opted for grad school. But on three occasions in those final months before returning to the halls of ivy, I almost left via the brig.

First came the Inspector Generals (IG) inspection. IGs are the guys they send out from D.C. to see if you’ve complied with the accumulated tonnage of orders, regulations, requirements and general odiosity from the Corps. Usually IGs were bearable, since the inspectors knew they would eventually go back to the operating forces and didn’t want to annoy their once and future comrades too badly. In fact, I wouldn’t have worried at all, except that I’d recently disposed of several hundred classified documents by shredding, and had inadvertently shredded the destruct roster as well, and had no way of accounting for anything.

Fortunately, I did have my master sergeant, aka “Top,” a gent whom nothing had bothered since the Korean War, not even getting invited to those up close and personal “tactical” atom bomb tests of the 1950s nor two subsequent Vietnam tours.

Inspection day dawned with visions of Portsmouth dancing in my head. I sent my scuzziest lance corporal out with a six-by (truck, to you) full of unauthorized gear, with orders to drive around the base until the inspection was over. He returned two weeks later and, when asked about the truck, replied, “You mean I had a truck with me?” But that’s another tale.

The IG team, “all friends of Top,” skipped the crypto vault and headed straight for my field radios: the old AN/PRC-25 backpack variety. You see, the telephone-style handset had a couple connectors inside. Upon sufficient bouncing about, they’d come loose, touch, and short out. So the Corps had issued a technical instruction to epoxy the connectors in place. Unfortunately, there was no epoxy in the supply system, and no one was allowed to spend the 89 cents or whatever on their own. So the IG team set to unscrewing mouthpieces. If you hadn’t epoxied the connectors, they wanted to know why you’d violated the order. If you had, they wanted to know where you got the glue.

Top offered to explain it all to them over a liquid lunch at the staff club. Apparently, he did. And I was safe … until getting stuck at the VIP table at the Camp Pendleton Passover Seder.

Now, as you can imagine, Jewish Marines weren’t all that common back then. Originally I had no intention of making the Seder, but the base Jewish chaplain importuned, and I figured the Reb, as the other chaplains called him (not always respectfully), had enough tsuris without hosting yet another unattended gala. As it turned out, a couple dozen folks blew in, including the base commanding general and the First Marine Division commanding general, and their ladies … two couples with even less desire to be there than I.

A few minutes into the pre-meal rituals, I noticed that the generals and their ladies were imitating everything I was doing, liturgically meaningful or not. So I started making up traditions. They kept copying. Why, they asked, are we doing it this way and everybody else is doing something different? Oh, I assured them, that’s the Ashkenazic custom. We’re going Sephardic. Up at the officiating table, the Reb was turning colors, red to yellow to green, and back again.

We came to the commemoration of the Ten Plagues. Usually, you either dip your finger in your wine glass as each Plague is named or you spoon a bit of wine onto your plate. I started us on finger-dips for two Plagues, then shifted to spoons for two more, then had them banging spoons on plates for two Plagues after that. At this point, they noticed the Reb choking on Plague No. 7 and realized what was going on. Fortunately, generals can never admit they’ve been snookered by lieutenants. That, or they were at least as dinky dau … and/or far more gracious … than I.

Probably just as well that it ended when it did. I was getting ready to walk them around the table for Plagues No. 8 through 10.

Several weeks later, I did have people walking around a table.

Back then, there was racial tension. Lots of racial tension. So the Marine Corps decided that everyone should have Human Relations (HumRel) instruction, 20 hours worth, spread over five mornings. Unfortunately, I was hanging around the battery office, looking for my early-release papers, when the quota for a HumRel trainer came in. So they shipped me off to a weeklong instructors’ course. I graduated first in the class, having gotten a 98 on the true-false test, and they sent me back to teach the gun bunnies what was to become known as sensitivity.

We had a text. Actually, an “Our American Values” quasi comic book. In the 1960s, most basic manuals had gone comic book, including the M-16 rifle disassembly and maintenance guide (Chapter One: “How to Strip Your Sweet 16”), but that’s another story. First four sessions, we sat around a conference table and reacted to the drawings and balloons.

“What do you think, Private Smith?”

“Dunno, sir.”

“What do you think, Corporal Jones?”

“Oh, I agree with Private Smith.”

Fridays were different. That’s when we discussed conditions at the local base, including self-segregation, interracial sex, dapping (elaborate black-power handshakes), et cetera. When we got to the dating stuff, the scrawniest brother at the table made a comment about white male sexual prowess, as explicit as it was uncomplimentary. The nearest Caucasian immediately reached over and began acquainting his head with the tabletop, and there ensued several minutes of mass violence and general bad manners.

Once was nasty enough. When it happened the second cycle, I figured there was a pattern emerging. So did my captain. So did my colonel. So did a general or two, who suggested via the chain of command that a bit more decorum, and no more incident reports that had to go to headquarters, might be nice. Especially if I wanted to avoid being held on active duty for the investigations, which might take forever. So Thursday evening before my final class, I called the area guard shack.

“This is Lieutenant Gold. I’ll be teaching sex education tomorrow and would like the reaction force standing by.”

Next morning, 20 or so Marines sat around the table, revving up. I announced the subject, then opened the door. In marched a dozen Marines in riot gear. They surrounded the table and made not a sound, save for a discreet tapping of their batons on the wall behind them.

We had a fascinating seminar, an open, genuine, and informative exchange of views. I subsequently spent 14 years as a college professor. Would that all my classes had been so … well received.

 

Will Russia Win?

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Like almost all other Westerners, at the time the Russian-Ukrainian War broke out in February 2022 I was convinced that the Russians would fail to reach their objectives and lose the war. Putting the details aside, this prediction was based on the following main three pillars.

First, the numerous failures, after 1945, of modern, state-run armed forces to cope with uprisings, insurgencies, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, asymmetrical warfare, and any number of similar forms of armed conflict. Think of Malaysia—yes, Malaysia, so often falsely claimed by the British as a victory. Think of Algeria, think of Vietnam, think of Iraq, think of dozens of similar conflicts throughout Asia and Africa. Almost without exception, it was the occupiers who lost and the occupied who won.

Second, the size of Ukraine’s territory and population made me and others think that Russia had tried to bite off more than it could swallow. The outcome would be a prolonged, very bloody and very destructive, conflict that would be decided not so much on the battlefield but by demoralization both among Russia’s troops and among its civilian population. As, indeed, happened in 1981-1988 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, only to get involved in a lengthy counter-insurgency campaign that ended not just in military defeat on the ground but in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This line of reasoning was supported by the extreme difficulty the Russians faced before they finally succeeded in bringing Chechnya, a much smaller country, to heel.

Third, plain wishful thinking—something I shared with most Western observers. Including heads of state, ministers, armed forces, intelligence services, and the media.

Since then four very eventful months have passed. As they went on, the following factors have forced me to take another look at the situation.

First, the Ukrainians are not fighting a guerrilla war. Instead, as the list of weapons they have asked the West to provide them with shows, they have been trying to wage a conventional one: tank against tank, artillery barrel against artillery barrel, and aircraft against aircraft. All, apparently, in the hope of not only halting the Russian forces but of expelling them. Given that the Russians can fire ten rounds for every Ukrainian one, such a strategy can only be a sure recipe for defeat.

Second, a change in Russian tactics. Greatly underestimating their enemies, the Russians started the war by attempting a coup de main against the center of Ukrainian power at Kiev. When this failed it took them some time to decide what to do next; they may even have replaced a few of their top ranking generals. But then they regrouped and switched to the systematic reduction of Ukrainians cities and towns. Much as, in 1939-40, Stalin and his generals did to Finland. As in both that war and World War II as a whole they resorted to what has traditionally been their most powerful weapons, i.e massed artillery. It now appears that the change enabled them to reduce their losses to levels that they can sustain for a long time. Perhaps longer than the Ukrainians who, by Zelensky’s own admission, are losing as many as 100-200 of their best fighters killed in action each day.

Third, Western military technology, especially anti-aircraft weapons, anti-tank weapons, and drones may be excellent. However, limited numbers, the result of years and years of parsimony and the belief that war in Europe had become impossible, plus the need to retrain the relevant Ukrainian personnel, means that it has been slow to arrive in the places where it is most needed. Not to mention the fact that, whereas the Russians are fighting close to home, NATOs lines of communication stretch over hundreds of miles all the way from Ukraine’s borders with Poland, Slovakia and Romania in the west to the Donbas in the east. Almost all the terrain in between is flat, devoid of shelter, and thinly populated.  Meaning that it is ideal for the employment of airpower, precisely the field in which Russian superiority over Ukraine is most pronounced.

Fourth, strict censorship is making the impact of Western economic sanctions on Russia’s population hard to asses. If there is any grumbling, it is being energetically suppressed. Meanwhile, a look at the macroeconomics seems to show that Russia is coping much better than many Westerners expected. Gold reserves have been inching up, enabling Putin to link his currency to gold—the first country to do so since Switzerland went in the opposite direction back in 1999. The Ruble, which early in the war came close to collapse, is back to a seven-year high against the dollar, trend upward. Given the fall in imports as well as the tremendous rise in energy prices, more money is flowing into Russia’s coffers than ever before. Most of that money comes from selling energy, foodstuffs and raw materials to countries such as China and India. China in turn is now the world’s number one industrial power; once its current troubles with COVID-19 are over, it should be well able to provide Russia with almost any kind of industrial product it needs, and do so for a long time to come.

Fifth, the economic impact of the war on the West has been much greater than anyone thought. Saving Ukraine form Russian’s clutches is not like doing the same with Afghanistan. On both sides of the Atlantic inflation is higher than it has been at any time since 1980. Especially in regard to energy, which Russia is refusing to provide Europe with, it is giving rise not just to confusion but to some real hardship. Should it continue, as it almost certainly will, it will give rise to growing popular discontent with the war and demands that their countries’ involvement in it be reduced or brought to an end.  Even if that end means abandoning Ukraine and allowing Putin to have his way with it.

Last not least, beginning with the Enlightenment the West has long preened itself on being a fortress where liberty, law and justice prevail. Now the repeated, highly publicized, requisitioning of the property of so-called oligarchs is beginning to make some people wonder. First, no one knows what an “oligarch” is. Second, the fact that some “oligarchs” have been in more or less close touch with Putin over the years does not automatically turn them into criminals. Third, supposing they are criminals, it is not at all clear why they were left alone for so long and only began to be targeted after the war broke out. Could it be that, in combating the oligarchs, the West is undermining the justice of its cause?

To be sure, we are not there yet. But as growing number of statements that the war is going to be a long one show, it is now primarily a question of who can draw the deepest breath and hold out the longest. And when it comes to that, Russia’s prospects of coming out on top and obtaining a favorable settlement are not at all bad.